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Prosecutors in the Boardroom – Using Criminal Law to Regulate Corporate Conduct - NYU Press Scholarship Online
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Prosecutors in the Boardroom: Using Criminal Law to Regulate Corporate Conduct

Anthony S. Barkow and Rachel E. Barkow


In recent years, the Department of Justice has resolved investigations of dozens of Fortune 500 companies via deferred prosecution agreements and non-prosecution agreements, where, instead of facing criminal charges, these companies become regulated by outside agencies. Increasingly, the threat of prosecution and such prosecution agreements is being used to regulate corporate behavior. This practice has been sharply criticized on numerous fronts: agreements are too lenient, there is too little oversight of these agreements, and, perhaps most important, the criminal prosecutors doing the regula ... More

Keywords: deferred prosecution, Department of Justice, non-prosecution, corporate misconduct, corporate regulation, corporate behavior

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2011 Print ISBN-13: 9780814787038
Published to NYU Press Scholarship Online: March 2016 DOI:10.18574/nyu/9780814787038.001.0001


Affiliations are at time of print publication.

Anthony S. Barkow, editor

Rachel E. Barkow, editor

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