This concluding chapter proposes a comprehensive set of reforms to improve the current system of corporate regulation by prosecutors. Some of these reforms would require fundamental shifts in the way we currently approach nonprosecution agreements, deferred prosecution agreements, and settlement agreements. These include junking corporate criminal liability, making criminal law enforcement a key part of the regulatory enterprise of risk regulation, increasing the Securities and Exchange Commission's activity in addressing corporate misconduct, and reforming the role of corporate monitors and private actors. This chapter also emphasizes the need more empirical data about the effectiveness of settlement agreements in reducing corporate misconduct, the costs of their use, the availability of alternatives, and the costs and benefits of particular terms within agreements.
Keywords: reforms, prosecutors, nonprosecution agreements, deferred prosecution agreements, settlement agreements, corporate regulation, corporate criminal liability, risk regulation, corporate misconduct, corporate monitors
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