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Prosecutors in the BoardroomUsing Criminal Law to Regulate Corporate Conduct$
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Anthony S. Barkow and Rachel E. Barkow

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780814787038

Published to NYU Press Scholarship Online: March 2016

DOI: 10.18574/nyu/9780814787038.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM NYU Press SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.nyu.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright University of NYU Press Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in NYSO for personal use.date: 20 September 2021

The Institutional Logic of Preventive Crime

The Institutional Logic of Preventive Crime

Chapter:
(p.132) 6 The Institutional Logic of Preventive Crime
Source:
Prosecutors in the Boardroom
Author(s):

Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar

Publisher:
NYU Press
DOI:10.18574/nyu/9780814787038.003.0006

This chapter examines the institutional logic of preventive crime, with particular emphasis on the link between crime and preventive risk regulation. It first considers whether preventive criminal enforcement in the regulatory or national security context is an aberration and why lawmakers and executive officials support preventive criminal enforcement in the first place. It then explores the role that criminal justice can (or does) play in the modern regulatory state, along with the advantages that prosecutors and others in law enforcement can bring to the enterprise of risk regulation. It also discusses existing criminal law provisions and their relationship to risk regulation as well as the political economy of criminal enforcement in the context of the crime-regulation connection. Finally, it uses organization theory to explain how criminal justice operates in regulatory and national security domains.

Keywords:   preventive crime, risk regulation, criminal enforcement, national security, criminal justice, prosecutors, law enforcement, criminal law, organization theory

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