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Prosecutors in the BoardroomUsing Criminal Law to Regulate Corporate Conduct$
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Anthony S. Barkow and Rachel E. Barkow

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780814787038

Published to NYU Press Scholarship Online: March 2016

DOI: 10.18574/nyu/9780814787038.001.0001

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(p.1) Introduction
Prosecutors in the Boardroom

Anthony S. Barkow

Rachel E. Barkow

NYU Press

This book explores the debate about the use of criminal law to regulate corporate conduct. More specifically, it considers the power of prosecutors to regulate corporations accused of criminal wrongdoing through agreements consisting of nonprosecution agreements (NPAs) and deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs). Also known as settlement agreements, NPAs and DPAs allow companies to avoid indictments so long as they meet the prosecutors' regulatory terms. In many of these agreements, prosecutors impose affirmative obligations on companies to change personnel, revamp their business practices, and adopt new models of corporate governance. This book examines a number of fundamental questions that arise from the practice of corporate regulation by prosecutors, such as how the government should seek to deter corporate misconduct, how to promote good practices in prosecutorial involvement in corporate governance, how to improve coordination and minimize collisions between prosecutors and regulatory agencies, and how much power corporate monitors should have.

Keywords:   criminal law, corporate conduct, prosecutors, nonprosecution agreements, deferred prosecution agreements, settlement agreements, corporate governance, corporate misconduct, corporate monitors, corporate regulation

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