Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Evolution and MoralityNOMOS LII$

James E. Fleming and Sanford Levinson

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780814771228

Published to NYU Press Scholarship Online: March 2016

DOI: 10.18574/nyu/9780814771228.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM NYU Press SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.nyu.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright University of NYU Press Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in NYSO for personal use (for details see www.nyu.universitypressscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy/privacy-policy-and-legal-notice). Subscriber: null; date: 20 October 2018

Biopolitical Science

Biopolitical Science

Chapter:
(p.221) 8 Biopolitical Science
Source:
Evolution and Morality
Author(s):

Larry Arnhart

Publisher:
NYU Press
DOI:10.18574/nyu/9780814771228.003.0008

Abstract and Keywords

This chapter presents a theoretical framework for a biopolitical science that resolves some of the defects in contemporary political science. Critics of the contemporary state of political science have identified at least seven deficiencies—deficiencies that come from downplaying the importance in political science of history, morality, judgment, emotion, religion, ambition, and liberal education. The fundamental framework for biopolitical science is the theoretical analysis of political behavior as conforming to a nested hierarchy of three levels of deep history—the universal history of species, the cultural history of the group, and the individual history of animals within the group. To fully comprehend the human nature of politics, one must understand the unity of political universals, the diversity of political cultures, and the individuality of political judgments.

Keywords:   biopolitical science, contemporary political science, political behavior, political universals, political cultures, political judgments

Political science could become a true science by becoming a biopolitical science of political animals. This science would be both Aristotelian and Darwinian. It would be Aristotelian in fulfilling Aristotle’s original understanding of political science as the biological study of the political life of human beings and other political animals. It would be Darwinian in employing Charles Darwin’s evolutionary theory as well as modern advances in Darwinian biology to explain political behavior as shaped by genetic evolution, cultural evolution, and individual judgment.

Some political scientists have complained about the deficiencies of their discipline in understanding politics. A small but growing number of political scientists have argued that a political science rooted in an evolutionary theory of human nature could overcome many of these deficiencies.1 I will support this claim by laying out a theoretical framework for a biopolitical science that rectifies some of the defects in contemporary political science. To illustrate how such a biopolitical science accounts for the course of political history, I will show how such a science could deepen our understanding of one of the crucial turns in American political history—Abraham Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation of January 1, 1863.

(p.222) 1. The Poverty of Political Science

Critics of the contemporary state of political science have identified at least seven deficiencies that could be alleviated by a biopolitical science—deficiencies that come from playing down the importance in political science of history, morality, judgment, emotion, religion, ambition, and liberal education.

First, although history matters in the study of politics, because the significance of each political event depends on its place in a temporal sequence of events over extended periods of time, contemporary political science often ignores the historical character of political life. So, recently, some political scientists have sought to recover political history as an integral part of political science.2 Biopolitical science builds on this scholarship, while exploring the deep history of politics over millions of years that includes not only human beings but also other political animals, which draws from what some historians today call “big history”—the unification of natural history and human history into a grand narrative.3 This evolutionary political history moves through three levels—natural history, cultural history, and individual history. For example, to fully understand Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation, we need to see it as an event in the natural history of cooperation in the human species, in the cultural history of slavery in America, and in the individual history of Lincoln as a political actor in the Civil War.

Second, although morality matters in the study of politics, contemporary political science often ignores the moral dimensions of political life. Against the assumption of many political scientists that political behavior is motivated solely or predominantly by the rational maximization of self-interest, some political scientists have argued for going “beyond self-interest” to recognize the other-regarding motives of political actors that drive political controversy as a moral debate over the common good.4 Biopolitical science supports this position by showing how the evolved political nature of human beings as shaped by genetic and cultural group selection manifests not only a selfish concern for oneself and one’s kin but also a moral concern for reciprocity, fairness, and the good of the group. Homo politicus combines the traits of Homo economicus and Homo moralis. Lincoln’s participation in the debate over slavery (p.223) and emancipation shows this moral sense in the recognition of slavery as unjust exploitation, while also showing the need to accommodate the self-interest of the slaveholder as a constraint on the pursuit of justice.

Third, although judgment matters in the study of politics, contemporary political science has little to say about practical judgment in politics and how to distinguish good and bad political judgment. To rectify this defect, some political scientists have contended that political science needs to recognize and explain political judgment as an intellectual and moral virtue of practical wisdom that cannot be reduced to scientific or theoretical reasoning.5 Biopolitical science confirms Aristotle’s insight about the importance of prudence or practical judgment in morality and politics. Darwinian science recognizes that brains evolved to help animals who need to make practical decisions to satisfy their desires in response to the risks and opportunities offered by their physical and social environments. Human beings and other political animals have evolved brains that allow them to make practical judgments in circumstances of social complexity where knowledge must always be uncertain and imprecise. For human beings, such judgments require deliberate reflection. But they also require worldly experience, proper habituation, intuitive insight, and emotional dispositions that go beyond purely logical reasoning. Lincoln’s decision to issue the Emancipation Proclamation illustrates the intricacy—if not mystery—of practical judgment in politics.

Fourth, although emotion matters in the study of politics, political scientists who emphasize “rational choice” in explaining human behavior have often played down the role of emotion in political life, and generally many political scientists have assumed that emotion subverts rational decision making, particularly in democracies threatened by popular passions. And yet some political scientists have rightly argued that political decision making and rhetoric show the interdependence of reason and emotion, because human practical cognition is guided by the emotional dispositions of human nature, which is apparent, for example, in the power that emotion has in electoral behavior and political journalism.6 Biopolitical science shows how emotion belongs to the evolved nature of human beings and other political animals. Biological psychology uncovers the neural bases of emotion in the practical judgments of (p.224) political animals. The power of emotion in political rhetoric is illustrated in the passionate controversies surrounding the Civil War and Lincoln’s emancipation of slaves.

Fifth, although religion matters in the study of politics, many political scientists have ignored the political importance of religion, particularly those who have assumed that “modernization” would bring a withering away of religious belief. In recent years, the political effects of religion have been hard to ignore, which has made “politics and religion” a vibrant field of study.7 Even though Darwinian evolutionary thinking is sometimes associated with atheism, Darwin recognized religion’s importance in the moral evolution of human beings. Following Darwin’s lead, some biologists have developed an evolutionary theory of religion as a product of genetic and cultural evolution driven by group selection: religion is adaptive insofar as it helps groups to solve collective action problems and function as collective units.8 American political culture has always been deeply shaped by biblical religion, and so a critical part of the debate over slavery was whether it was compatible with the Bible. It was crucial, therefore, for Lincoln to defend his Emancipation Proclamation as conforming to biblical morality.

Sixth, although ambition matters in the study of politics, many political scientists look to impersonal laws of political behavior and abstract models of rational choice in which the personal ambition of political actors falls out of view. Against this tendency, some political scientists have asserted that politics is all about the manly spiritedness of ambitious political actors competing for importance.9 Biopolitical science recognizes such political ambition as the striving for hegemonic dominance that arises among political animals organizing themselves into hierarchies of dominance and submission. Among human beings and some other primates, this competition for dominance creates a tense balance of power between the desire of the dominant few to rule and the desire of the subordinate many to be free from exploitation. Lincoln was an example of a restlessly ambitious man who yearned to do something great in politics that would bring immortal glory to his name. His ambition was channeled and checked by the American system of constitutional government. But that constitutional system also allowed him to satisfy his ambition by winning the glory that came from issuing the Emancipation Proclamation.

(p.225) Seventh, although liberal education matters in the study of politics, the discipline of political science has become so specialized and fragmented as to be almost completely separated not only from the natural sciences and the humanities but even from the other social sciences, and thus it cannot be integrated into the interdisciplinary activity of liberal learning. Some political scientists worry that this professional isolation of political science from general education prevents students and scholars from seeing how the study of politics ultimately requires a general understanding of the place of human beings in the universe.10 Biopolitical science employs evolutionary thinking as a way of unifying knowledge across all the disciplines of the natural sciences, the social sciences, and the humanities to understand the evolved nature of human beings as political animals. This contributes to the intellectual project of what Edward O. Wilson calls “consilience,” the unification of all knowledge through biological science broadly conceived.11 This is illustrated by explaining Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation as an individual political judgment constrained by the natural history of the human species and the cultural history of American politics.

The fundamental framework for biopolitical science is the theoretical analysis of political behavior as conforming to a nested hierarchy of three levels of deep history—the universal history of the species, the cultural history of the group, and the individual history of animals within the group. To fully comprehend the human nature of politics, we must understand the unity of political universals, the diversity of political cultures, and the individuality of political judgments. I will work through these three levels of biopolitical history as they are generally manifested in human politics and as they are particularly illustrated in Lincoln’s decision to issue the Emancipation Proclamation.

2. Political Universals

Political universals are those stable tendencies of political behavior that characterize each species of political animal as shaped by its genetic evolutionary history. I will concentrate on political primates and particularly on human beings and on chimpanzees as the closest living primate relatives of human beings. Since the fossil record of evolution gives us little direct evidence for behavioral (p.226) evolution and since our understanding of how genes influence complex behavior is limited, we are forced into indirect inferences about the genetic evolution of political behavior based on triangulation of data from studies of chimpanzees and human hunter-gatherers. This assumes that chimpanzees give us the best proxies for the common ancestors of chimps and humans and that human hunter-gatherers give us the best proxies for hominid ancestors.12 This leaves room for plenty of controversy. My aim is only to make a plausible case.

The Ambivalent Behavioral Repertoire of Human Politics

Government and politics are universal to human beings, because they express a universal human nature as shaped by the genetic evolution of the human species.13 I define politics as the government of a society. A society is any group of individuals who cooperate with one another. A government is any ruling coordination of a society. The universal behavioral repertoire of human politics includes social behavior and governmental behavior. The repertoire of social behavior includes egoism, nepotism, mutualism, reciprocity, and group-selected morality. The repertoire of governmental behavior includes dominance, deference, and counterdominance (or resistance to dominance). These behavioral propensities can be found in some form among many animals.14 They belong to the list of what many anthropologists have identified as “human universals.”15

This behavioral repertoire shows the ambivalent or contradictory character of our human political nature.16 We are socially ambivalent animals, because our naturally egoistic propensities conflict with our naturally social propensities. We are politically ambivalent animals, because our natural propensities to dominance and deference conflict with our natural propensity to resist being dominated.

Egoism is the natural propensity of individuals to favor their own interests over those of other individuals. This arises from an evolutionary process in which individuals compete with one another for resources necessary for survival and reproduction.17

Nepotism is the natural propensity of individuals to cooperate more readily with their genetic relatives than with those who are (p.227) not related to them. This is to be expected if individuals evolved to enhance not just their individual survival and reproduction but also the survival and reproduction of collateral relatives.18

Mutualism is the natural propensity of individuals to cooperate when it is mutually beneficial to do so and when the benefits are direct and immediate. To secure the benefits, individuals must cooperate; if they don’t cooperate, they lose the benefits.19

Reciprocity is the natural propensity of individuals to cooperate with those people they expect to be cooperative in return. Direct reciprocity arises from the expectation that the beneficiaries of one’s cooperation will themselves reciprocate in kind.20 Indirect reciprocity arises from the tendency to cooperate with those who have a reputation for being cooperative.21

Group-selected morality is the natural propensity of individuals to cooperate with others with whom they feel an affiliative bond of group identity based either on face-to-face cooperative encounters or on a symbolic community sustained by moral norms of cooperation. This group-selected morality inclines individuals to be conditional cooperators—who cooperate as long as others are cooperating—and conditional punishers—who punish those who violate the norms of cooperation as long as others are also enforcing such sanctions.22 Cross-cultural studies using game-theory experiments show that moral norms vary across cultures in ways that reflect the diversity in the social ecology of these cultures but that moral variability is constrained by universal propensities to fairness rooted in evolved human nature.23 Just as human beings have an evolved language instinct that provides the universal principles for learning specific languages, they also have an evolved moral instinct that provides the universal principles for learning specific moral systems.24

Group-selected morality corresponds to what Darwin called “the moral sense.”25 He regarded the human moral faculty as the greatest distinction between human beings and other animals. And yet, he believed he could explain the evolution of human morality through the complex interaction of at least five factors. First, the social instincts would incline social animals to feel sympathy for other animals in their group and to cooperate with them. Second, the development of mental faculties would allow human ancestors to act in the light of past experience and future expectations, so (p.228) that an animal might feel regret for betraying a fellow group member. Third, the development of language would allow human ancestors to formulate norms of good behavior for the community, so that individuals would be more inclined to act for the public good. Fourth, the development of habit or social learning allows individuals to habituate themselves to conform to the standards of the community. Finally, the competition between groups would favor those groups with cooperative members over those groups that were less cooperative.

For Darwin, then, morality is identified with the good of the group and immorality with subverting the group. Consequently, the range of good conduct depends on the extension of the moral circle. The dark side of such group morality is that, while individuals can be good toward others they perceive to belong to their group, the same individuals can be vicious toward those outside their group. Much of the history of morality turns on whether the circle of group morality is narrow or wide. This adds to the ambivalent human nature of morality. Not only does acting in one’s self-interest sometimes conflict with acting for the good of one’s group, but acting for the good of one’s group sometimes conflicts with acting for the good of those outside one’s group. Although the circle of moral concern can be extended very far, perhaps even to include some humanitarian concern for distant strangers, group-selected morality always displays some form of tribalism or us-against-them psychology.26

Darwin’s evolutionary account of morality requires that evolutionary selection occur not only between individuals but also between groups. Group selection has been controversial among evolutionary biologists.27 But the debate in recent years has shifted in favor of Darwin’s conception of group selection as reformulated in David Sloan Wilson’s “multilevel selection” theory.28 At each level of the hierarchy of life, there is a fundamental problem—the group-level benefits of cooperating are in tension with the individual-level benefits of exploiting the group. If competition between individuals in the same group is intense, selection might favor cheating individuals over cooperative individuals. But if the competition between groups is more intense than the competition within groups, then selection might favor cooperative individuals who help their groups compete better than groups with less (p.229) cooperative individuals. (The depth of this problem throughout the hierarchy of life becomes clear as soon as we recognize that what we call an “individual” or an “organism” is a biological group of cells that manages to act as a collective unit.) This problem of group selection becomes even more complex when we see the ambivalence of political behavior in the tension between dominance and deference.

Dominance is the natural propensity of individuals to seek the power over others that comes from superior rank in a group. The political life of primates is organized around dominance hierarchies in which the old tend to have dominance over the young and males tend to have dominance over females, although females also have a dominance hierarchy. This is a political universal for chimpanzees, both in the wild and in captivity, and for human beings throughout history. Winning or losing dominance is determined by patterns of coalition formation that depend on shifting circumstances and individual decisions.29

Deference is the natural propensity of individuals to submit to those who are dominant. As political universals, deference is the correlative of dominance. Among the various species of political primates, there are distinctive behavioral cues, both verbal and nonverbal, by which subordinates defer to dominants.

Counterdominance is the natural propensity of individuals to resist being dominated. Among some primates, subordinate individuals can resist excessive dominance and thus limit the power of dominant individuals. Subordinate individuals can form alliances to challenge those at the top of the hierarchy. The variation in this behavior creates differences in dominance style across species. Rhesus monkeys show a “despotic dominance” style in which subordinates cannot challenge dominants. But chimpanzees show an “egalitarian dominance” style in which subordinates can restrain dominants. Dominant individuals are expected to mediate conflicts within the group and to lead the group in conflicts with other groups. Among chimpanzees, dominant individuals can be challenged or even deposed if they do not properly carry out their conflict-mediation role. Like chimpanzee politics, human politics shows a dominance hierarchy that can be egalitarian in style, based on the principle that leaders are only “first among equals.”30 This egalitarianism is most evident among human hunter-gatherers (p.230) who use various kinds of sanctions to punish leaders who become too despotic in their dominance. This resistance to dominance was probably a crucial part of human evolutionary history in the Pleistocene epoch (beginning about two million years ago). But, with the establishment of large bureaucratic states based on agricultural production, which began more than five thousand years ago, most states have been more despotic than egalitarian. The recent emergence of constitutional democracies—over the past two centuries—is in some ways a return to the “egalitarian dominance” of the foraging way of life in which subordinates limit the power of dominants.31 Thus, one can see the entire history of civilization as a struggle between freedom and domination.32

To the old question of political philosophy as to whether human beings are naturally hierarchical or naturally egalitarian, the answer from biopolitical science is that human beings are both. Machiavelli was right to see that human political nature is torn by the tension between the propensity of the few to dominance and the propensity of the many to resist dominance.33 The history of political practice and political thought turns on this natural ambivalence interacting over time with particular political circumstances and decisions.

While I have drawn this conclusion about the ambivalent character of the evolved nature of human beings from comparisons with chimpanzees, the conclusion would still stand if one were to look to bonobos as the primate model for human evolutionary ancestry. Bonobos or pygmy chimpanzees (Pan paniscus) are similar to and yet distinct from chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Although bonobos seem somewhat more peaceful than chimps, bonobos still show a tense balance between competition and cooperation. And, although bonobos seem somewhat more egalitarian than chimps, bonobos do have dominance hierarchies among both males and females. Some primatologists see female dominance over all. Others see a codominance shared by the alpha male and the alpha female.34

In any case, if human ancestry is traceable back to a common ancestor shared with bonobos as well as chimps, one would expect human beings to show an ambivalent balance in their nature—competition balanced against cooperation and a propensity to dominance balanced against a propensity to resist dominance.35 (p.231) Research on the neurophysiology of social behavior suggests that the desire for status or dominance in human beings and other primates is associated with biochemical factors such as serotonin and testosterone. Those individuals in dominant positions have higher levels of serotonin and testosterone, while those in subordinate positions have lower levels.36 Moreover, the physiological character of status is suggested by the fact that those with high status tend to have better health than those with low status.37 The mechanisms here are complex because of the interaction of many factors in the body and with the external physical and social environment. But the evidence suggests that some people are temperamentally inclined to have a stronger dominance drive than others.

Lincoln’s Leadership in the Conflict over Slavery

Here, then, is the fundamental ambivalence in the political nature of human beings. People like Abraham Lincoln naturally desire dominance, and many other people naturally defer to the dominant leadership of men like Lincoln. Even an egalitarian political regime based on the principle that the people can govern themselves cannot dispense with the leadership of ambitious men like Lincoln. But there is also a natural desire to be free from despotic dominance. In an early speech, Lincoln warned that the greatest danger to the perpetuation of the American republic would come from ambitious men seeking glory to satisfy their dominance drive. The people need such leaders. But they also need to restrain the ambitious dominance of such leaders. Lincoln, as noted, was himself an intensely ambitious man who yearned to do something great to earn immortal glory. After he signed the Emancipation Proclamation, he told one of his friends that he had finally satisfied that dream of glory that he had had since he was a young man.38

The great question, particularly in a republican regime, is whether egalitarianism and dominance can be reconciled through a balance of power that allows for a leadership style of egalitarian dominance. Lincoln is the model of egalitarian leadership in American political history because he found a way to satisfy his personal ambition for power by advancing the principle of equal liberty in popular government and winning the glory of emancipating the slaves.

(p.232) Lincoln’s handling of the slavery debate also shows a prudent recognition of the social ambivalence in human nature that comes from the conflict between human egoism and human morality. For Lincoln, the dispute over slavery showed two opposing sides of human nature. He observed:

Slavery is founded in the selfishness of man’s nature—opposition to it, is his love of justice. These principles are an eternal antagonism; and when brought into collision so fiercely, as slavery extension brings them, shocks, and throes, and convulsions must ceaselessly follow. Repeal the Missouri compromise—repeal all compromises—repeal the Declaration of Independence—repeal all past history, you still cannot repeal human nature. It still will be the abundance of man’s heart, that slavery extension is wrong.39

Lincoln saw that the Southerners themselves were torn between their selfish interest in preserving slavery and their moral feeling that slavery was wrong.40 He also saw that any stable political order—particularly one with a popular form of government—had to be rooted both in self-interest and in morality. That’s why he accepted the constitutional protections for slavery in the South as a prudent compromise with slavery out of respect for the interests of the South. But he also looked to the “ultimate extinction” of slavery, which would be served best by restricting slavery’s extension into the Western territories. In devising plans for emancipation, he repeatedly argued for a scheme of compensated emancipation with voluntary colonization of the emancipated slaves in Africa or some other land outside the United States. He explained: “Will springs from the two elements of moral sense and self-interest. Let us be brought to believe it is morally right, and, at the same time, favorable to, or, at least, not against, our interest to transfer the African to his native clime, and we shall find a way to do it, however great the task may be.”41

Lincoln argued that human beings were naturally equal in their right not to be ruled over without their consent. Government by consent of the governed was egalitarian, not in the sense that everyone would have absolutely equal authority but in the sense that those with superior authority would derive their authority from the consent of the citizens. Rulers would be only the “first among equals.”

(p.233) Slavery was wrong, Lincoln believed, because it denied this principle of equal right to be governed only by one’s consent. Lincoln thought: “As I would not be a slave, so I would not be a master. This expresses my idea of democracy. Whatever differs from this, to the extent of the difference, is no democracy.”42 This same idea is found in egalitarian foraging communities, where it is based on the thought that “all men seek to rule, but if they cannot rule, they prefer to be equal.”43

Slavery could be justified, however, if there were some biologically natural difference between masters and slaves such that the slaves were naturally adapted for their slavery and the masters naturally adapted for their mastery. Citing Aristotle’s comments about the possibility that some human beings were slaves by nature, American proslavery advocates argued that the black race was physically, mentally, and morally adapted by nature for enslavement. They appealed to the racial science of scientists like Samuel Morton and Josiah Nott, who claimed that the human races were actually separate species that could be ranked as superior and inferior.

Against this racial science was the argument of Darwin and others that the human races were only varieties of one human species. Darwin’s science of the unity of humanity supported Lincoln’s affirmation of human equality as rooted in the universal nature of all human beings.44 In fact, one of Darwin’s motivations for writing The Descent of Man was to refute the biological arguments for slavery. He followed closely the news of the American Civil War, and he rejoiced when the war finally brought the emancipation of the slaves.45

For Lincoln, conceding the morality of slavery would deny the principles of democratic republicanism, because the arguments used to morally justify slavery are the same arguments that have been made for kingship. He warned: “They are the arguments that kings have made for enslaving the people in all ages of the world. You will find that all the arguments in favor of kingcraft were of this class: they always bestrode the necks of the people, not that they wanted to do it, but because the people were better off for being ridden.”46

For almost all political scientists today, there is no controversy here, because they agree with Larry Diamond “that democratization (p.234) is generally a good thing and that democracy is the best form of government.”47 Biopolitical science supports this idea with the claim that modern democracy satisfies the natural human desire for egalitarian leadership shaped originally in the Pleistocene evolutionary history of human ancestors who lived in hunter-gatherer groups. But human hunter-gatherer groups—like groups of chimpanzees—are typically small communities of 30 to 150 individuals bound together by face-to-face interactions. If human beings evolved to live in such small groups, how was it possible for them to live in bureaucratic states with large populations of individuals with no direct ties of kinship or acquaintance? And, if human beings evolved to live in egalitarian societies, why has democracy been so rare over the past five thousand years of political history, in which monarchy, despotism, and slavery have been much more common than democracy, liberty, and equality? To address these questions, biopolitical science must move from natural history to cultural history.

3. Political Cultures

Political cultures are the variable patterns of political behavior of each species of political animals as shaped by cultural evolution and constrained by genetic evolution. Biopolitical science must study not only the political universals that constitute the enduring behavioral repertoire of political animals but also the political cultures that diversely express that behavioral repertoire in the cultural history of political animals. The history of government among human beings shows how human political cultures for structuring rule evolve as constrained manifestations of the human political universals of human political nature. This is illustrated by how Lincoln’s handling of the Emancipation Proclamation was shaped by American political culture.

The Question of Animal Culture

We can define culture as “a system of socially transmitted patterns of behavior, preferences, and products of animal activities that characterize a group of social animals.”48 By such a definition, some nonhuman animals have culture, because many animals in (p.235) complex societies show some capacity for the social transmission of material and social traditions of culture. The evidence for culture is clear among chimpanzees, because each chimpanzee community has its own distinctive repertoire of cultural traditions.49 This cultural uniqueness of each chimpanzee community comes into view, for example, if one reads Jane Goodall’s account of the chimpanzees at Gombe; one realizes that this is a political history that manifests both the political universals that might be seen in any chimpanzee community and the political culture unique to the chimpanzees at Gombe.50

Culture is particularly important for human beings, and thus any biological account of human politics must include cultural evolution as well as genetic evolution. Darwin recognized that, once natural selection had shaped the social instincts and intellectual capacities of human beings, moral and political progress would depend primarily on cultural learning, which would include habituation, instruction, social traditions, individual reasoning, and religious beliefs.51 Recently, evolutionary theorists have revived Darwin’s program for studying the complex evolutionary interaction of innate propensities and cultural learning.52

Human cultural evolution is uniquely human insofar as it is based on information transmitted through symbolic communication.53 Aristotle was right: human beings are not the only political animals by nature, but they are the most political animals by nature because of the political complexity of human learning through conceptual symbolism.54 The human capacity for symbolic communication explains why human beings—unlike other primates—have moved beyond small foraging groups to form political communities with huge populations that do not depend on face-to-face interaction. Social insects like bees can live in communities with comparably large populations because of a system of chemical communication that allows a colony to function as a collective unit.55 Human beings do this through a system of symbolic communication by which cooperating groups can be defined by symbolic markers.56 Human rulers derive their authority from some belief system that supports the social stratification and the political institutions of their community. A belief system consists of symbolic markers that hold people together in a community. Although it does not have to be religious, it usually is. For example, (p.236) the Protestant Reformation was politically explosive because it challenged the Roman Catholic tradition of authority and thus altered those symbolic markers of biblical religious belief that had bound European people together into large communities. For the European Protestants who settled in America, biblical religion was foundational for their politics, as they drew even their codes of law from Mosaic law.57

Deep History

For any science of political cultural history, we need a typology of regimes that generalizes about the structures of political rule. S. E. Finer’s magisterial History of Government provides a modern political typology in the tradition of Aristotle’s regime analysis.58 Finer’s typological history of government is a deeper history than one usually finds among contemporary political scientists. Even those political scientists who stress the importance of political history tend to rely on a shallow history—the history of the past few centuries. At least, this is a slightly deeper history than that of those political scientists whose historical context is the last few decades! But it’s still shallow compared with Finer’s history of government, which begins with the first appearance of the Sumerian city-state around 3,500 B.C. And yet, even Finer’s deep history is not deep enough, because he ignores the preliterate political experience of human beings. Assuming that true history begins with written records is common for historians, but it shows a remarkably narrow view of history that reflects the fundamentalist biblical notion that all human history began six thousand years ago in the Middle East.59 Biopolitical science looks for a deeper history that embraces the entire evolutionary history of politics, from the Pleistocene to the present. The intellectual advantage of such a deep Darwinian history of politics is that it brings into view the general evolutionary patterns that are lost in shallow political history. This Darwinian history belongs to what some historians today call “big history” or “deep history.”60

In its most expansive form, as in the work of David Christian, this deep Darwinian history encompasses the complete scientific history of the universe starting at the Big Bang thirteen billion years ago. After surveying the modern scientific understanding of (p.237) the origins and history of the universe, the stars, the Earth, and life on Earth, Christian turns to human evolutionary history from the Paleolithic era to the present. He divides human history into three stages corresponding to three major eras of human social life: the foraging era (from 250,000 years ago to 10,000 years ago), the agrarian era (from 10,000 years ago to 1750 A.D.), and the modern era (from 1750 to the present). The most general pattern for Christian’s history is set forth by Eric Chaisson61—the emergence of ever more complex levels of order requires that the flow of energy be structured to sustain order against the entropic tendency of the second law of thermodynamics. Within that cosmic pattern, human history’s three eras can be seen as three levels of ever more complex order that require ever more complex means for extracting energy to sustain ever greater human populations. Foragers extract energy through hunting wild animals and gathering wild plants. Farmers extract energy through cultivating domesticated plants and herding domesticated animals. In the modern era, humans have come to rely increasingly on fossil fuels as sources of energy. This energy in plants, animals, and fossil fuels comes ultimately from the Sun.62

Another general pattern in human history as seen by Christian is set by the human capacity for collective learning. Although many animals have some capacity for learning, human language enhances the human capacity for learning beyond anything seen in the rest of the animal world. This permits human beings to spread widely over varying niches in their ecosystems and to construct new niches, thus extending the evolutionary niche construction carried out by other organisms.63 The human history from foraging to farming to modernity is largely the history of human collective learning as human beings learned new ways to extract energy from their environments to sustain ever larger populations of human beings in ever more complex societies, so that now human beings live in a global system of collective learning that has transformed life on Earth.

Lincoln had some understanding of this evolutionary deep history as the context for American political history. According to William Herndon, his friend and law partner, Lincoln was persuaded to accept the idea of universal evolutionary history from his reading of Robert Chambers’s Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation, a (p.238) book first published in 1844 that Darwin later acknowledged as anticipating his own theory of evolution.64 Lincoln had a remarkably deep view of human cultural evolution that follows the pattern of Darwinian universal history set forth by Darwin and by scientific historians like Christian. In his “Lecture on Discoveries and Inventions,” his “Address to the Wisconsin State Agricultural Society,” and in his meeting with some American Indian chiefs, Lincoln laid out his conception of cultural evolution as moving through three stages of society—from foraging societies to agrarian societies to societies based on commercial exchange and free labor.65 Like Aristotle, Darwin, and Christian, Lincoln believed that human beings were unique in the animal world because of the human capacity for symbolic speech, which allowed for collective learning in the artful domination of nature for the material, moral, and intellectual improvement of human life. Originally, all human beings lived by foraging, a way of life still manifested in Lincoln’s day among some of the Native American Indians. The invention of agriculture supported human civilization as an advance beyond the savage life of foragers. But, despite the progress in civilization in agrarian states, such states were founded on slavery and other forms of coerced labor, so that rulers lived by exploiting peasant labor. Lincoln saw that the Industrial Revolution based on commercial exchange and free labor was bringing a new revolution in human cultural evolution that promised the physical, moral, and intellectual liberation of labor. He saw the abolition of slavery as a crucial move toward this new state of society, which would bring a “new birth of freedom” in which all human beings would have a fair chance in the “race of life.”

The History of Regimes

The clearest pattern in the Darwinian history of politics is a movement through these three stages or ways of life—the foraging way, the agrarian way, and the modern way.66 Throughout the Pleistocene epoch, until about eleven thousand years ago, all human beings lived in small foraging or hunter-gatherer bands that resembled chimpanzee bands in size and structure. But then the development of agriculture based on the domestication of plants and animals brought the emergence of larger, more settled societies (p.239) and, eventually, large bureaucratic states, beginning in Mesopotamia, Egypt, India, China, and Mesoamerica. Over the past five thousand years, hunter-gatherer bands have dwindled in number and eventually disappeared from most parts of the world. During this period of bureaucratic states, as Finer shows, the most common form of regime has been the “Palace,” in which the dominant ruler might be variously identified as a king, an emperor, a prince, a tyrant, or a dictator—one person, with an aristocratic bureaucracy and military support, who rules in an often despotic manner.67 By contrast, the “Forum”—a regime open to “the people” and public debate—was extremely rare, emerging in ancient Athens, the Roman Republic, the medieval European city-states, and Renaissance Italy. But, then, in seventeenth-and eighteenth-century Europe, the authority of kings was challenged by appeals to the authority of the people. This brought a radical shift in claims to legitimacy toward the assumption that every regime—even a monarchy—had to claim some authorization from the people.68 In the modern history of regimes, the mandate to rule had moved from the king’s Palace to the people’s Forum. A true science of politics must explain this pattern in the history of government and what it suggests about the future of government. A biopolitical science explains this through the complex interaction between genetic political history and cultural political history.

The biopolitical scientist sees the genetic evolution of human ancestors in the Pleistocene as shaping the behavioral repertoire of human political nature as adapted for the hunter-gatherer or foraging way of life. Human beings are by nature socially ambivalent, being both selfish and social, and politically ambivalent in both desiring dominance and desiring not to be despotically dominated. Hunter-gatherers enforce an ethic of cooperative sharing, but this breaks down in times of conflict when their natural selfishness is displayed. They enforce an ethic of egalitarian leveling, but this requires stringent sanctions against the natural tendency of some to dominate. Although there is no formal or enduring structure of dominance, there is informal and episodic leadership by those individuals with personal qualities that earn them more prestige than others.69

Bureaucratic states with often despotic regimes based on kingly and oligarchic rule offered many benefits over hunter-gatherer (p.240) societies.70 Most important, bureaucratic states were militarily powerful and thus favored in cultural group selection over political communities that could not sustain great military power. And yet, biopolitical science suggests that liberal democracies conform better than bureaucratic states to the evolved social and political nature of human beings.71 Liberal democracy approximates some of the central traits of a foraging society—individual liberty, social solidarity, and an egalitarian dominance structure in which the desire of the few to dominate is checked by the desire of the many to be free from despotic dominance. The natural appeal of liberal democracy to the multitude of human beings was largely frustrated for thousands of years, until modern social and political conditions shifted in favor of democratic regimes.

In the modern world, many innovations of political culture—as surveyed by Finer—favored the growth of modern constitutional republicanism.72 The idea of limited monarchy was invented in the ancient Jewish kingdoms and then transmitted through the Bible into the political thought of Europe.73 The ideas of the citizen (as opposed to the subject), of democracy, and of government as accountable to the governed were invented in ancient Greece. The ideas of checks and balances and government by rule of law were invented in ancient Rome. These political ideas from Greece and Rome were transmitted throughout Europe as part of a tradition of republican political thought. The idea of representation as invented in medieval Europe was added to this republican tradition. In the American colonial and early national experience, all of these inherited ideas of republican political culture were combined with new political inventions that favored republican government—a written constitution, federalism, the presidency, and judicial review.74 These institutional innovations are human inventions. They are artificial, not natural. And yet, their success depended on their satisfying the social needs and desires of evolved human nature in the cultural conditions of the modern world. As one constitutional scholar has observed, “constitutionalism is a human creation that results from the interaction between human nature and the brute facts of social existence in a postneolithic world.”75

John Adams, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and others among the American founders recognized that popular governments for thousands of years had suffered from serious defects (p.241) that prevented them from competing with monarchic regimes. Democracies and republics tended to be too small in territory and population to withstand the military power of monarchic empires. Democracies and republics also tended to lack the energetic leadership possible in monarchic regimes. The American founders combined the new ideas of republicanism so as to join liberty and power and to unite local governments into a large national union. For example, the American presidency was a novel cultural invention that combined much of the energetic leadership of a monarch with the limitations on power that come from a written constitution with checks and balances.76 The office of the presidency was designed to attract people of restless ambition, those moved by the love of fame and glory. But their ambition would be channeled through a constitutional system in which ambition would counteract ambition, and thus the presidency would be turned away from the despotic excesses of monarchic power. Madison and others hoped that such institutional novelties would provide “a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government.”77

The American founders foresaw that the political offices in the new American republic would attract the “natural aristocracy” of those people moved by ambition and avarice to seek to rule, and the problem would be how to structure and check their desire for domination.78 John Adams insisted that human nature would always tend toward societies with three social orders—a deferential multitude, an oligarchic few, and one leader at the top. Adams thought that such social ranking could be found among many animals, because it satisfied the natural desire for status or distinction. A well-designed constitution should balance these three natural orders—the one, the few, and the many—so that they check one another and their passions are directed to the public good.79

If such a structure of rule is rooted in evolved human nature, then the aim of those friendly to democratic government should be not to abolish all dominance hierarchy but to channel and restrain it. The same conclusion seemed to follow from the great twentieth-century debate among political scientists over elite theory and pluralism. If even the most radical of socialist democrats cannot abolish the “iron law of oligarchy,” then a realistic conception of democracy might have to combine elite rule and (p.242) democratic accountability through a republican regime of balanced and limited powers.80 Biopolitical science explains this as showing that equality of rank without any hierarchy at all is contrary to evolved human nature.81

Lincoln’s Ambition and the Emancipation of Slaves

To see how the political culture of a constitutional republic can reconcile dominance and democracy, consider, again, the political career of Lincoln and particularly his decision to issue the Emancipation Proclamation. By 1854, Lincoln saw the debate over slavery as providing him the national stage on which he could display his talents and satisfy his quest for glory. He looked a lot like that “towering genius” he had described in his Lyceum Address of 1838—“it thirsts and burns for distinction; and, if possible, it will have it, whether at the expense of emancipating slaves, or enslaving freemen.”82 But, in American constitutional government, such desire for dominance is structured by the Constitution. Although Lincoln was always clear in condemning slavery as morally wrong, he recognized that the constitutional framers had provided constitutional protection for slavery in the South, even as they hoped for the “ultimate extinction” of slavery. So he was neither an abolitionist nor proslavery. But, while the Constitution protected slavery in the South, he thought, there was no constitutional duty to allow for slavery to be introduced into the Western territories. Restricting the Western expansion of slavery was important to sustain the principle that slavery was wrong—as contradicting the principle of equality in the Declaration of Independence—although “practical necessity” might dictate tolerating it in the existing slaveholding states.83

During the first year of the Civil War, Lincoln began to consider whether he might use his presidential power in war to emancipate the slaves in the South. His power to do that was constrained by all of those principles of republican political culture that had been put into the Constitution.84 As president, he could not violate the constitutional protections for slavery. But he was constitutionally invested with all the powers of the commander in chief in time of war. And therefore he might constitutionally issue an emancipation order if it could be justified as a military necessity. The final (p.243) Emancipation Proclamation was carefully worded to apply only to the states or parts of states that were still in rebellion against the Union as of January 1, 1863. The rationale was that this would promote military victory for the North by allowing Union troops to advance into the South with the promise of emancipation for the slaves, who might then be recruited as soldiers. Lincoln needed congressional support for his decision. He was also constrained by federalism in that the border states fighting on the side of the Union—Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri—were slave states. And he had to worry about whether judicial review would allow federal courts to overturn his decision. He made it clear that the permanent abolition of slavery would require the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment. He also had to consider whether public opinion was ready for this, because he foresaw that the Democrats would use this as an issue against the Republican Party in the congressional elections of 1862. He also had to anticipate the possibility of being defeated for reelection in 1864. In all of these ways, his presidential power for emancipating slaves was circumscribed by the constitutional system.

In the final Emancipation Proclamation, Lincoln appealed to five principles: “And upon this act, sincerely believed to be an act of justice, warranted by the Constitution, upon military necessity, I invoke the considerate judgment of mankind, and the gracious favor of Almighty God.”85 As we have seen, a crucial part of human political culture is the use of symbolic communication to bind people into large groups and then persuade them to work together for the common good. Here and elsewhere, we can see Lincoln’s rhetorical skill in the use of moral, political, and religious symbolism to persuade his audience to act collectively. He appeals not only to legal and pragmatic considerations—the Constitution and military necessity—but also to higher principles of justice, the universal judgment of mankind, and Divine Providence.

For Lincoln, the “philosophical basis” of American political culture was stated in the Declaration of Independence—the principle of natural human equality of rights as dictating government by the consent of the governed, a principle rooted not just in American history but in human nature.86 The real issue at the foundation of the American regime, Lincoln believed, was the universal conflict in political history between the desire of some human beings for (p.244) despotic dominance and the desire of the rest of humanity to be free from such despotic dominance.

It is the eternal struggle between these two principles—right and wrong—throughout the world. They are the two principles that have stood face to face from the beginning of time; and will ever continue to struggle. The one is the common right of humanity and the other the divine right of kings. It is the same principle in whatever shape it develops itself. It is the same spirit that says, “You work and toil and earn bread, and I’ll eat it.” No matter in what shape it comes, whether from the mouth of a king who seeks to bestride the people of his own nation and live by the fruit of their labor, or from one race of men as an apology for enslaving another race, it is the same tyrannical principle.87

For Lincoln, the alternative to kingly dominance was popular government by the consent of the governed, in which the dominance of the few would be checked by popular consent. He thought that such principles as stated in the Declaration of Independence should be the ground for uniting all regions of the country—North and South—into one Union. But this was hard to achieve, because the United States was divided into distinctive cultural traditions traceable back to different British folkways.88 The Civil War as interpreted by Lincoln’s rhetoric was a crucial turning point in the cultural political evolution of the United States, because it brought smaller social units into a national union bound together by shared symbolic norms of republican liberty and equality of opportunity.

Lincoln knew that one fundamental element of America’s shared political culture was the commitment to biblical religion. Although Lincoln revealed his atheism in some private conversations with a few friends, he was careful to conceal this in public, and he often invoked the Bible as an authoritative text for American political culture.89 Unfortunately, the Bible did not clearly resolve the debate over slavery.90 In his Second Inaugural Address, Lincoln vividly conveyed the theological problem dividing the two sides in the Civil War: “Both read the same Bible, and pray to the same God; and each invokes His aid against the other.”91 Many passages in the Bible support slavery. But some of the general teachings of the Bible—such as the equality of all human beings as created (p.245) in God’s image—could be used to condemn slavery. Lincoln’s rhetoric is full of biblical references and imagery, and he had to read the Bible as clearly teaching the wrongness of slavery.92 And yet, if the Civil War was a theological crisis over the interpretation of the Bible, as Mark Noll has observed, “it was left to those consummate theologians, the Reverend Doctors Ulysses S. Grant and William Tecumseh Sherman, to decide what in fact the Bible actually meant.”93

This reminds us that, while the cultural evolution of politics through group selection can turn on intricate moral and religious debates, these debates are often resolved by force of arms. The biopolitical study of political cultural evolution must include the evolutionary history of war. Recent research confirms Darwin’s claim that group selection through warfare created the conditions among human ancestors for social cooperation and morality.94 This research also supports Thucydides’s observation that human beings go to war when fear, interest, or honor move them to fight for their community against opposing communities.95 As Winston Churchill observed, “Great battles, whether won or lost, change the entire course of events, create new standards of values, new moods, new atmospheres, in armies and in nations, to which all must conform.”96

Of course, when Lincoln decided in 1862 to issue the Emancipation Proclamation, he could not know the outcome of the war or the ultimate consequences of his Proclamation. That’s generally true of political judgments—political actors must decide what to do under conditions of such uncertainty that they cannot know whether they have made the right decision. A biopolitical science must account for such practical reasoning.

4. Political Judgments

Political animals must make political judgments. To understand politics, we must understand the political judgments of individual political actors as they navigate their way through the unique circumstances of their political lives. The problem, however, is that political judgment is not usually governed by any precise and rigorous formulations of logical proof, and therefore it is not clear that political judgment can be explained through the scientific (p.246) methods of modern political science. This problem underlies the old debate as to whether the study of politics is properly a science or an art. The debate turns on the distinction between two kinds of knowledge, with proponents of the “scientific study of politics” favoring the knowledge that comes from methodical rationalism and their critics favoring the knowledge that comes from practical wisdom. The critics—people like Isaiah Berlin,97 Michael Oakeshott,98 and Leo Strauss99—insist that the technical rationality of modern scientific methodology cannot rightly grasp the practical reality of politics as it appears to citizens and statesmen, because this practical knowledge of politics requires the particular insights of prudential judgment, rather than the abstract generality of theoretical science. These critics of modern political science suggest that we need to revive an older tradition of political science as rooted in Aristotle’s recognition of prudence as the practical wisdom required for politics.100 This debate poses a stark choice between placing the study of politics in the realm of natural science and placing it in the realm of humane knowledge.

Biopolitical science pursues a third alternative. If the choice is between the physical sciences and the humanities, then the study of politics surely belongs with the humanities. But, if biology is the natural science that includes all of life, including human life, then the study of politics should be seen as a biological science of political animals that is both a natural science and a humanistic art. Such a biological political science must understand politics as it is understood by citizens and statesmen, in which political knowledge requires political judgment.

The Prudence of Political Animals

Political judgment is manifested in the communities of chimpanzees and bonobos studied by primatologists.101 These primate studies provide social and political biographies based on the life histories of the animals in each community. Each must begin with a “who’s who” of personalities, because each animal is a unique individual in a unique community. Each animal’s distinctive personality arises from a combination of inherited and acquired tendencies. One cannot fully understand the behavior of these animals unless one knows the life history of each individual as it (p.247) interacts with the other individuals. These animals need practical intelligence, because they need to make decisions from moment to moment about how to work their way through a complex social network of ever-changing relationships of kinship, friendship, and hierarchy. To succeed, they must understand the making and breaking of alliances and coalitions. To do this, they must understand how to interpret and employ a complex repertoire of verbal and nonverbal signals that convey emotional and factual information about their social environment. The ranking of individuals in the community depends on a complex range of factors, including age, sex, temperament, intelligence, and contingent events. Among chimps, the males seem to be more dominant than the females. But de Waal has seen coalitions of females among captive chimps that can challenge the alpha male. And, among the bonobos, there is an alpha male, but his dominance seems to be embedded within a social network of matriarchal dominance.

Some of these animals are low ranking because they seem not to care much about striving for dominance. Others show an intense dominance drive. Success in reaching the top depends on many factors. Goodall observes: “Factors other than age, which determine the position of a male in the dominance hierarchy include physical fitness, aggressiveness, skill at fighting, ability to form coalitions, intelligence, and a number of personality factors such as boldness and determination.”102 The intricacy of chimpanzee social life requires a complex social awareness. Thus, Goodall concludes: “There is no doubt whatsoever that a chimpanzee is capable of assessing the complexities of the ever-changing social environment and planning his own behavior accordingly.”103

Until recently, Lody has been the alpha male in the bonobo group in the Milwaukee County Zoo, which has the largest collection of bonobos in captivity. After ten years of careful study, the human observers have concluded that Lody shows “good judgment” and “evidence of wisdom, in the Aristotelian sense: the ability to see life in all its aspects and to act in a way that benefits others.”104 Aristotle might have agreed, because he indicated in his biological writings that some animals show prudence insofar as they learn from experience and use forethought in judging what is good for their lives, and he also recognized that the apes were the animals most closely related to human beings.105

(p.248) Lincoln’s Prudence

Like other political primates, human beings need leaders with practical judgment, and someone like Lincoln exemplifies such leadership. Explaining Lincoln’s leadership—as in his Emancipation Proclamation—requires that biopolitical science move through many levels of analysis. At the level of the natural history of political universals, we could explain Lincoln’s political life as manifesting the sort of dominance drive or political ambition that one sees throughout political history in every political community. At the level of the social history of political cultures, we could explain Lincoln’s political life as shaped by the peculiar political culture of nineteenth-century America, which would include the constitutional framework of American government and the problem of slavery in American politics. Finally, at the level of the individual history of political judgment, we could see how Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation was constrained by the political universals of political ambition and the political culture of American political institutions. But this would still not fully explain Lincoln’s political judgment in deciding to issue the Emancipation Proclamation.

As Aristotle indicated, political judgment is an exercise in prudence, which is an intuitive capacity of moral character to judge what should be done in particular circumstances where it is impossible to infer any right answer by general rules or logical proof. The historical contingency and complexity of political life make it necessary to rely on such practical wisdom in circumstances where it is impossible to determine the right answer by purely logical means. We can see this in the debate over Lincoln’s decision to issue the Emancipation Proclamation, a debate that began in Lincoln’s lifetime and continues today among historians and social scientists, some of whom dispute the wisdom of his decision,106 while others defend him.107 I agree with those scholars who argue that Lincoln’s decision manifests his Aristotelian prudence, because it shows Lincoln acting to enforce enduring moral principles within the constraints of his practical circumstances so as to avoid the extremes of unprincipled opportunism on the one hand and moralistic absolutism on the other.108

Studying prudential judgment is difficult, because it’s a form of practical reasoning and moral temperament that cannot be (p.249) explained simply as an exercise in pure logic or abstract generalization.109 Figuring out how human beings make judgments in practical situations of irreducible uncertainty and inevitable error is one of the fundamental problems in the social sciences.110 We can study it best by considering particular examples of it, as in the biographies of prudent moral and political leaders like Lincoln. The political biographies of political actors—human and nonhuman—are an essential part of biopolitical science.

If prudence, like all mental activity, is ultimately an exercise of the brain and nervous system, then we can deepen our study by exploring the ever-advancing knowledge that comes from neuroscience, which can illuminate the character of political judgment as rooted in the brain. This research in neuroscience indicates the dependence of judgment on worldly experience, emotional dispositions, intuitive insights, and narrative thinking, confirming Aristotle’s account of political prudence and rhetorical persuasion.111

Neuroscience helps us to understand prudence as a natural moral faculty rooted in the human brain as shaped by human evolutionary history for solving moral problems.112 Neuroscientific and evolutionary theories of moral judgment confirm Aristotle’s insight that “thought by itself moves nothing,” because moral motivation is driven by moral emotions.113 Such research into the neural grounds of moral and political judgments must be part of biopolitical science.

5. Objections and Replies

I can anticipate at least three objections to my proposal for a biopolitical science. First, some critics will object to what they see as an unreasonable reductionism. They will say that in joining Wilson’s project for “consilience,” based on a unification of all knowledge through biology, I am reducing political life to physical and biological causes in a way that leaves no room for those modes of understanding politics that come from the humanistic disciplines, such as history, philosophy, and rhetoric. Second, some critics will worry that a biopolitical science assumes a biological determinism that denies human freedom. They will say that human political actors are capable of deliberate choices that cannot be explained by the deterministic causes of biology. Finally, a different group of critics—those (p.250) who agree that political science should be a natural science—will complain that the biopolitical science I have sketched lacks the predictive power necessary for a true science. After all, they might say, the ultimate aim of a true science of politics is not just to interpret political events in the past (like Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation) but to predict the future course of political events through scientific laws of political behavior.

Emergent Complexity

There is plenty of evidence for the charge that Wilson’s vision of consilience is strongly reductionistic. “The central idea of the consilience world view,” he declares, “is that all tangible phenomena, from the birth of stars to the workings of social institutions, are based on material processes that are ultimately reducible, however long and tortuous the sequences, to the laws of physics.”114 But, against this idea of consilience through strong reductionism, which I find unpersuasive, Wilson often recognizes an alternative idea of consilience through emergent complexity, which I find more persuasive and which I regard as a fundamental idea for biopolitical science.115

The simplest expression of the idea of emergence is that a whole can be greater than the sum of its parts. Emergent phenomena are those complex wholes with properties that we could not explain or predict from our knowledge of the parts. For example, we see emergent properties in water that we could not have predicted from the properties of hydrogen and oxygen. The emergent evolution of novelty is manifested throughout the evolution of the universe.116

The idea of emergent evolutionary complexity supports biopolitical science as a nonreductive science that explains political order as the joint product of natural propensities, cultural traditions, and individual judgments. The natural propensities as shaped in the genetic evolution of human beings will constrain but not determine the cultural traditions of political life. These natural propensities and cultural traditions will then constrain but not determine the practical judgments of political actors about what should be done in particular cases, as in Lincoln’s decision to issue the Emancipation Proclamation. To explain this complex interaction (p.251) of nature, culture, and judgment, biopolitical science will draw pertinent knowledge from all the intellectual disciplines—the natural sciences, the social sciences, and the humanities.

Emergent Freedom

Biopolitical science recognizes that the emergent evolution of the human brain gives human beings a uniquely human freedom of thought and action, which should allay the fear of biological determinism. The human mind is an emergent product of the evolution of the primate brain once it passed a critical threshold of size and complexity in the neocortex, particularly in the frontal lobes. With the evolution of ever larger and more complex frontal lobes, primates have more behavioral flexibility than other animals. They have the capacity for voluntary action, in the sense that they can learn to alter their behavior in adaptive ways in response to complex and ever-changing circumstances in their social and physical environments. That’s why it’s not unreasonable to speak of chimpanzees as exercising judgment or prudence. In human evolution, the evolution of the primate brain passed a critical threshold, enabling human beings to use words and images to compare alternative courses of action through mental trial and error.117 Consequently, human beings are capable not just of voluntary action but of deliberate choice by which they self-consciously choose present courses of action in the light of past experiences and future expectations to conform to some general plan of life.

As a matter of common experience, we all know that we can exercise free choice by deliberately reflecting on the choices before us and then concentrating our mental force to execute the choice that we desire. A big part of becoming a mature adult is learning how to do this and habituating ourselves to do it well. Having a normally functioning human brain makes this possible.

Modern neuroscience is beginning to explain how this works. Using brain-imaging technology, we can now see how mental concentration changes the neuronal activity of the brain. The mind that emerges from the human brain can change the brain itself.118 This emergent power of the brain for mental attention enables human freedom, which supports the freedom of human political actors in exercising judgment.

(p.252) Predicting Patterns

Because of the complexity and freedom of human political behavior, any science of politics must be a science of history based on historical narratives. By contrast with nonhistorical sciences, historical sciences have only limited predictive power. At best, political science can make general predictions about political patterns. But it cannot make specific predictions about political events. Biopolitical science deepens the historical narratives of political science by grounding them in the evolutionary history of political animals, which moves through three kinds of historical narratives: natural history, cultural history, and biographical history. And yet, this biopolitical history cannot provide the precise predictions that are possible in the nonhistorical sciences.119

Evolutionary biology and the social sciences are historical sciences of emergent complexity. By contrast, physical sciences such as physics and chemistry are nonhistorical sciences of reductive simplicity.120 Except for historical disciplines such as cosmology and geology, physical scientists study physical phenomena without reference to their history. Many social scientists—particularly economists—have taken physics as the model for all science, and they have tried to unify the social sciences as founded on a social physics free from historical contingency.121 But biopolitical science rejects this approach. Biopolitical science recognizes that social phenomena are necessarily historical, and therefore they can be explained only through historical narratives, which cannot have the predictive precision that is achieved through the deterministic laws of the physical sciences. Pursuing social physics sacrifices accuracy for the sake of precision, because it ignores the fuzzy complexity of social reality. Pursuing biopolitical history sacrifices precision for the sake of accuracy, because it recognizes that fuzzy complexity.122

Although biopolitical science cannot provide deterministic laws, it can provide probabilistic regularities, which support falsifiable but fuzzy predictions of behavioral patterns. For example, evolutionary game theory has developed formal models of the natural behavioral repertoire that I have laid out, and those models can generate falsifiable predictions that can be tested through experimental game playing. This research shows a complex interaction (p.253) among natural history, cultural history, and individual history. There are some universal behavioral patterns that manifest a natural history of the human species that has shaped human beings to be both self-regarding and other-regarding. But there is great cultural variation in that behavior that manifests a cultural history that has shaped some societies to be quite different from others. And yet, there is also great variation across individuals that cannot be precisely predicted from what we know about natural and cultural history.

Consider, for instance, the playing of the “ultimatum game.” In this game, there are two players under conditions of anonymity. Both players are told that there is a specified sum of money to be divided between the two players. One player is told to propose a division of the money to the other player. The responding player can either accept or reject the proposal. If the responder accepts the proposal, the money will be divided as proposed. If the responder rejects the proposal, then neither player receives any money. Assuming that human beings are purely self-regarding egoists, rational-choice theorists will predict that the responder will accept any proposed division, because any money is better than none, while the proposer will want to take most of the money and give the responder as little as possible. But Darwinian evolutionary theorists, who think human beings have evolved to have other-regarding moral concerns, will predict that responders will indignantly reject unfair offers, and proposers will feel obligated to offer fair divisions of the money, somewhere around an even split. The Darwinians predict that human beings will on average show a sense of fairness in reciprocity by their willingness to punish those who make unfair offers, even when inflicting the punishment is costly to the punisher.

The experimental play of the ultimatum game generally confirms the predictions of the Darwinians—in most cases, responders reject unfair proposals, and proposers feel compelled to offer fair divisions. But, while this evidence suggests that a sense of fairness is part of the natural behavioral pattern of most human beings, a substantial portion of the participants in these experiments (about one quarter) behave in a purely selfish manner.123 And, in a few societies—particularly, in small-scale societies where there is no experience with market exchange to cultivate a culture of (p.254) reciprocal fairness—almost everyone behaves in a purely selfish manner.124 So, although we can’t make specific predictions based on deterministic laws, we can make general predictions based on probabilistic propensities.

Similarly, political scientists could not have precisely predicted Lincoln’s signing of the Emancipation Proclamation. But political scientists could have predicted that chattel slavery would provoke resistance from those who saw that it violates the natural moral desire for justice as reciprocity, and political scientists might have predicted that the cultural circumstances of American constitutionalism would create opportunities for ambitious political actors to satisfy their desire for glory by promoting the ultimate extinction of slavery. Once Lincoln issued the Proclamation, political scientists could begin a debate over what kind of historical narrative best accounts for that political event. Biopolitical science contributes to that debate by providing a broad theoretical framework for such a historical narrative as moving through the natural history of slavery, the cultural history of slavery in America, and the biographical history of Lincoln as the political actor who won his glory in becoming the Great Emancipator.

6. Conclusion

The biopolitical science of political animals overcomes many of the defects of contemporary political science. Biopolitical science recognizes that history matters, because it provides a deep history of politics embracing the natural history of political universals, the social history of political cultures, and the individual history of political judgments. It recognizes that morality matters, because it studies the natural biological roots of the human moral sense manifested in political controversy. It recognizes that judgment matters, because it studies political judgments as cultural and individual expressions of evolved human nature. It recognizes that emotion matters, because it shows how the evolved emotional dispositions of human nature shape political action and thought. It recognizes that religion matters, because it explains religion as an evolutionary adaptation that helps political groups work together as collective units. It recognizes that ambition matters, because it studies political ambition as expressing the evolved striving for dominance. Finally, (p.255) it recognizes that liberal education matters, because it employs evolutionary biology to study politics in a way that integrates ideas and methods from the natural sciences, the social sciences, and the humanities. With biopolitical science at the center of a Darwinian liberal education, we can better understand how human beings as political animals find their home in the order of living nature.

Notes

This chapter is a revised version of “Biopolitical Science,” Politics and the Life Sciences 29 (2010): 24–47. I am grateful to the Association for Politics and the Life Sciences for permission to republish this paper.

(1.) John R. Alford and John Hibbing, “The Origin of Politics: An Evolutionary Theory of Political Behavior,” Perspectives on Politics 2 (2004): 707–23; Larry Arnhart, “The New Darwinian Naturalism in Political Theory,” American Political Science Review 89 (1995): 389–400; Larry Arnhart, Darwinian Natural Right: The Biological Ethics of Human Nature (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998); Robert Blank and Samuel Hines, Biology and Political Science (London: Routledge, 2001); Peter Corning, The Synergism Hypothesis: A Theory of Progressive Evolution (New York: McGraw Hill, 1983); Peter Corning, Holistic Darwinism: Synergy, Cybernetics, and the Bioeconomics of Evolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); Gary R. Johnson, “The Evolutionary Origins of Government and Politics,” in Human Nature and Politics, ed. Albert Somit and Steven A. Peterson (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1995), 243–305; Roger D. Masters, The Nature of Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989); Roger D. Masters, Beyond Relativism: Science and Human Values (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1993); Albert Somit and Steven A. Peterson, The Failure of Democratic Nation Building: Ideology Meets Evolution (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Bradley A. Thayer, Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2004); James Q. Wilson, The Moral Sense (New York: Free Press, 1993).

(2.) Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek, The Search for American Political Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).

(3.) David Christian, Maps of Time: An Introduction to Big History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004).

(4.) Jane Mansbridge, ed., Beyond Self-Interest (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990); Elinor Ostrom, “Collective Action and the Evolution of (p.256) Social Norms,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 14 (2000): 137–58. Elinor Ostrom, “Policies That Crowd Out Reciprocity and Collective Action,” in Moral Sentiments and Material Interests: The Foundations of Cooperation in Economic Life, ed. Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles, Robert Boyd, and Ernst Fehr (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 253–75.

(5.) Ryan Patrick Hanley, “Political Science and Political Understanding: Isaiah Berlin on the Nature of Political Inquiry,” American Political Science Review 98 (2004): 327–39; Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1991); David Ricci, The Tragedy of Political Science (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); Leslie Paul Thiele, The Heart of Judgment: Practical Wisdom, Neuroscience, and Narrative (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

(6.) Michael Billig, “Political Rhetoric,” in Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology, ed. David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 222–50; George Marcus, W. Russell Neuman, and Michael MacKuen, Affective Intelligence and Political Judgment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000); George Marcus, The Sentimental Citizen: Emotion in Democratic Politics (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002); George Marcus, “The Psychology of Emotion and Politics,” in Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology, ed. David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis, 182–91; W. Russell Neuman, George E. Marcus, Ann N. Crigler, and Michael MacKuen, eds., The Affect Effect: Dynamics of Emotion in Political Thinking and Behavior (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007); Maria Elizabeth Grabe and Erik Page Bucy, Image Bite Politics: News and the Visual Framing of Elections (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

(7.) Ted G. Jelen and Clyde Wilcox, eds., Religion and Politics in Comparative Perspective: The One, the Few, and the Many (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

(8.) David Sloan Wilson, Darwin’s Cathedral: Evolution, Religion, and the Nature of Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002); David Sloan Wilson, “Human Groups as Adaptive Units: Toward a Permanent Consensus,” in The Innate Mind, vol. 2: Culture and Cognition, ed. Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence, and Stephen Stich (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 78–90.

(9.) Harvey Mansfield, Manliness (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006); Harvey Mansfield, “How to Understand Politics,” First Things, no. 175 (August/September 2007): 41–47.

(10.) Larry Arnhart, “Darwinian Liberal Education,” Academic Questions 19 (2006): 6–18; Ricci, Tragedy of Political Science.

(p.257) (11.) Edward O. Wilson, Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge (New York: Knopf, 1998).

(12.) Christopher Boehm, Hierarchy in the Forest: The Evolution of Egalitarian Behavior (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999); Alexandra Maryanski and Jonathan H. Turner, The Social Cage: Human Nature and the Evolution of Society (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992); John Tooby and Irven DeVore, “The Reconstruction of Hominid Behavioral Evolution through Strategic Modeling,” in The Evolution of Human Behavior: Primate Models, ed. Warren G. Kinzey (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 183–237.

(13.) Johnson, “Evolutionary Origins of Government.”

(14.) Lee Alan Dugatkin, Cooperation among Animals: An Evolutionary Perspective (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Martin A. Nowak, Evolutionary Dynamics: Exploring the Equations of Life (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006); Martin A. Nowak, “Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation,” Science 314 (2006): 1560–63.

(15.) Donald Brown, Human Universals (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991).

(16.) Boehm, Hierarchy; Masters, Nature of Politics.

(17.) Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).

(18.) William D. Hamilton, Narrow Roads of Gene Land: The Collected Papers of W. D. Hamilton (Oxford: W. H. Freeman, 1995).

(19.) Corning, Synergism, 84–88, 103–20, 254–58; Dugatkin, Cooperation, 31–34.

(20.) Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Robert Trivers, “The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism,” Quarterly Review of Biology 46 (1971): 35–57.

(21.) Richard Alexander, The Biology of Moral Systems (Hawthorne, NY: Aldine de Gruyter, 1987); Karl Sigmund, The Calculus of Selfishness (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).

(22.) Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles, Robert Boyd, and Ernest Fehr, “Moral Sentiments and Material Interests: Origins, Evidence, and Consequences,” in Moral Sentiments and Material Interests, ed. Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles, Robert Boyd, and Ernst Fehr, 3–40; Natalie Henrich and Joseph Henrich, Why Humans Cooperate: A Cultural and Evolutionary Explanation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Ernst Fehr and Urs Fischbacher, “Third Party Sanction and Social Norms,” Evolution and Human Behavior 25 (2004): 63–87; Ernst Fehr and S. Gachter, “Altruistic Punishment in Humans,” Nature 415 (2002): 137–40; Sigmund, The Calculus of Selfishness.

(23.) Joseph Henrich, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, (p.258) Ernst Fehr, and Herbert Gintis, eds., Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

(24.) Arnhart, Darwinian Natural Right; Marc Hauser, Moral Minds: How Nature Designed Our Universal Sense of Right and Wrong (New York: Harper-Collins, 2006).

(25.) Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man, 2d ed. (London: Penguin Books, 2004), 119–72, 679–82; Charles Darwin, Charles Darwin’s Notebooks, 1836–1844, ed. P. H. Barret, P. J. Gautrey, S. Herbert, D. Kohn, and S. Smith (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 617–29.

(26.) David Berreby, Us and Them: Understanding Your Tribal Mind (New York: Little, Brown, 2005).

(27.) George C. Williams, Adaptation and Natural Selection: A Critique of Some Current Evolutionary Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966); George C. Williams, Natural Selection: Domains, Levels, and Challenges (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).

(28.) Elliott Sober and David Sloan Wilson, Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998); Wilson, “Human Groups as Adaptive Units”; David Sloan Wilson, Evolution for Everyone: How Darwin’s Theory Can Change the Way We Think about Our Lives (New York: Delacorte Press, 2007); David Sloan Wilson and Edward O. Wilson, “Rethinking the Theoretical Foundation of Sociobiology,” Quarterly Review of Biology 82 (2007): 327–48.

(29.) Boehm, Hierarchy; Jane Goodall, The Chimpanzees of Gombe: Patterns of Behavior (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986); Alexander H. Harcourt and Frans de Waal, eds., Coalitions and Alliances in Humans and Other Animals (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Arnold Ludwig, King of the Mountain: The Nature of Political Leadership (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2002); Allan Mazur, Biosociology of Dominance and Deference (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005); Frans de Waal, Chimpanzee Politics: Power and Sex among Apes (New York: Harper and Row, 1982); Frans de Waal, Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996).

(30.) De Waal, Good Natured, 125–32.

(31.) Boehm, Hierarchy.

(32.) Alexander Rustow, Freedom and Domination: A Historical Critique of Civilization (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980); James C. Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009).

(33.) Niccolo Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, trans. Harvey Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 1.4–5, 1.16.

(p.259) (34.) Takayoshi Kano, The Last Ape: Pygmy Chimpanzee Behavior and Ecology (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992); Ian Parker, “Swingers,” The New Yorker, July 30, 2007, 48–61; Jo Sandin, Bonobos: Encounters in Empathy (Milwaukee: Zoological Society of Milwaukee and the Foundation for Wildlife Conservation, 2007); Frans de Waal and Frans Lanting, Bonobo: The Forgotten Ape (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Richard W. Wrangham and Dale Peterson, Demonic Males: Apes and the Origins of Human Violence (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1996).

(35.) Frans de Waal, Our Inner Ape (New York: Penguin Books, 2005).

(36.) Douglas Madsen, “Serotonin and Social Rank among Human Males,” in The Neurotransmitter Revolution: Serotonin, Social Behavior, and the Law, ed. Roger D. Masters and Michael T. McGuire (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1994), 146–58; Allan Mazur and Alan Booth, “Testosterone and Dominance in Men,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1998): 353–63; James M. Dabbs and Mary Godwin Dabbs, Heroes, Rogues, and Lovers: Testosterone and Behavior (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2000); Peter T. Ellison, “Social Relationships and Reproductive Ecology,” in Endocrinology of Social Relationships, ed. Peter T. Ellison and Peter B. Gray (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 54–73.

(37.) Michael Marmot, The Status Syndrome: How Social Standing Affects Our Health and Longevity (New York: Henry Holt, 2004).

(38.) Abraham Lincoln, The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, ed. Roy P. Basler, 9 vols. (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1953), 1:8, 108–15; William H. Herndon, Herndon’s Life of Lincoln (New York: Da Capo Press, 1983), 172, 422–23.

(39.) Lincoln, Collected Works, 2:271.

(40.) Lincoln, Collected Works, 2:263–64.

(41.) Lincoln, Collected Works, 2:409.

(42.) Lincoln, Collected Works, 2:532.

(43.) Boehm, Hierarchy, 105.

(44.) Arnhart, Darwinian Natural Right, 189–208.

(45.) Adrian Desmond and James Moore, Darwin’s Sacred Cause: How a Hatred of Slavery Shaped Darwin’s Views on Human Evolution (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2009); Adam Gopnik, Angels and Ages: A Short Book about Darwin, Lincoln, and Modern Life (New York: Knopf, 2009); James Lander, Lincoln and Darwin: Shared Visions of Race, Science, and Religion (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2010).

(46.) Lincoln, Collected Works, 7:500.

(47.) Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 2.

(48.) Eva Jablonka and Marion J. Lamb, Evolution in Four Dimensions: (p.260) Genetic, Epigenetic, Behavioral, and Symbolic Variation in the History of Life (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 160.

(49.) William McGrew, The Cultural Chimpanzee: Reflections on Cultural Primatology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); A. Whiten, J. Goodall, W. C. McGrew, T. Nishida, V. Reynolds, Y. Sugiyama, C. E. G. Turin, R. W. Wrangham, and C. Boesch, “Cultures in Chimpanzees,” Nature 399 (1999): 682–85; A. Whiten, J. Goodall, W. C. McGrew, T. Nishida, V. Reynolds, Y. Sugiyama, C. E. G. Tutin, R. W. Wrangham, and C. Boesch, “Charting Cultural Variants in Chimpanzees,” Behaviour 138 (2001): 1481–1516; Andrew Whiten, “The Identification and Differentiation of Culture in Chimpanzees and Other Animals from Natural History to Diffusion Experiments,” in The Question of Animal Culture, ed. Kevin N. Laland and Bennett G. Galef (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 99–124.

(50.) Jane Goodall, Chimpanzees of Gombe.

(51.) Darwin, Descent of Man, 121–22, 158, 163, 167, 169, 688–89.

(52.) Peter J. Richerson and Robert Boyd, Not by Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed Human Evolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); Joseph Henrich and Richard McElreath, “Dual-Inheritance Theory: The Evolution of Human Cultural Capacities and Cultural Evolution,” in The Oxford Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology, ed. R. I. M. Dunbar and Louise Barrett (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 555–70.

(53.) Terence W. Deacon, The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of Language and the Brain (New York: Norton, 1997); Kim Hill, “Animal ‘Culture’?,” in The Question of Animal Culture, ed. Kevin N. Laland and Bennett G. Galef (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 269–87; Jablonka and Lamb, Evolution.

(54.) Aristotle, History of Animals, 488a7–14; Politics, 1253a1–18; Larry Arnhart, “Aristotle, Chimpanzees, and Other Political Animals,” Social Science Information 29 (1990): 479–559; Larry Arnhart, “The Darwinian Biology of Aristotle’s Political Animals,” American Journal of Political Science 38 (1994): 464–85.

(55.) Jurgen Gadau and Jennifer Fewell, eds., Organization of Insect Societies: From Genome to Sociocomplexity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009); Bert Holldobler and E. O. Wilson, The Ants (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990); Bert Holldobler and E. O. Wilson, The Superorganism: The Beauty, Elegance, and Strangeness of Insect Societies (New York: Norton, 2009); Thomas D. Seeley, Honeybee Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).

(56.) Henrich and Henrich, Why Humans Cooperate; Peter Turchin, War and Peace and War: The Rise and Fall of Empires (New York: Penguin Books, 2006).

(57.) Donald S. Lutz, The Origins of American Constitutionalism (Baton (p.261) Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988); Eric Nelson, The Hebrew Republic: Jewish Sources and the Transformation of European Political Thought (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010).

(58.) S. E. Finer, The History of Government, 3 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

(59.) Daniel Lord Smail, On Deep History and the Brain (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008).

(60.) Christian, Maps of Time; Ian Morris, Why the West Rules—For Now: The Patterns of History, and What They Reveal about the Future (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010).

(61.) Eric Chaisson, Cosmic Evolution: The Rise of Complexity in Nature (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001).

(62.) Oliver Morton, Eating the Sun: How Plants Power the Planet (New York: HarperCollins, 2008).

(63.) F. John Odling-Smee, Kevin N. Laland, and Marcus W. Feldman, Niche Construction: The Neglected Process in Evolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).

(64.) Herndon, Life of Lincoln, 354; Robert Chambers, Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation, ed. James A. Secord (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).

(65.) Lincoln, Collected Works, 2:437–42, 3:356–63, 3:471–82, 6:151–52; Eugene F. Miller, “Democratic Statecraft and Technological Advance: Abraham Lincoln’s Reflections on ‘Discoveries and Inventions,’ ” Review of Politics 63 (2001): 485–515; Lander, Lincoln and Darwin, 7–13; Larry Arnhart, “Abraham Lincoln’s Biblical Liberalism,” St. John’s Review 36 (Summer 1985): 25–40.

(66.) Gerhard Lenski, Ecological-Evolutionary Theory (Boulder, CO: Paradigm, 2005; Ted C. Lewellen, Political Anthropology: An Introduction, 3d ed. (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003); Chris Scarre, ed., The Human Past: World Prehistory and the Development of Human Societies, 2d ed. (London: Thames and Hudson, 2009).

(67.) Finer, History, 1:34–87.

(68.) Reinhard Bendix, Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).

(69.) E. Adamson Hoebel, The Law of Primitive Man: A Study in Comparative Legal Dynamics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954); Richard B. Lee, The !Kung San: Men, Women, and Work in a Foraging Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 343–50, 457–61; Allen W. Johnson and Timothy Earle, The Evolution of Human Societies: From Foraging Group to Agrarian State, 2d ed. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000), 54–89; Robert L. Kelly, The Foraging Spectrum: Diversity in Hunter-Gatherer Lifeways (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, (p.262) 1995), 295–97; Doron Shultziner, Thomas Stevens, Martin Stevens, Brian A. Stewart, Rebecca J. Hannagan, and Giulia Saltini-Semerari, “The Causes and Scope of Political Egalitarianism during the Last Glacial: A Multi-Disciplinary Perspective,” Biology & Philosophy 25 (2010): 319–46.

(70.) Lewellen, Political Anthropology; Masters, The Nature of Politics; Roger Masters, Machiavelli, Leonardo, and the Science of Power (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996).

(71.) Boehm, Hierarchy; Maryanski and Turner, The Social Cage; Mark F. Grady and Michael T. McGuire, “The Nature of Constitutions,” Journal of Bioeconomics 1 (1999): 227–40; Paul Rubin, Darwinian Politics: The Evolutionary Origin of Freedom (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002).

(72.) Finer, History, 1:87–94.

(73.) Daniel J. Elazar, Covenant and Polity in Biblical Israel (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1995); Yoran Hazony, “Does the Bible Have a Political Teaching?,” Hebraic Political Studies 1 (2006): 137–61; Nelson, Hebrew Republic.

(74.) Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967); Paul Rahe, Republics Ancient and Modern: Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992).

(75.) Donald S. Lutz, Principles of Constitutional Design (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 26.

(76.) Charles C. Thach, The Creation of the Presidency, 1775–1789 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969).

(77.) Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist, ed. Jacob E. Cooke (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1961), 65.

(78.) Bernard Bailyn, ed., The Debate on the Constitution: Federalist and Antifederalist Speeches, Articles, and Letters during the Struggle over Ratification, 2 vols. (New York: Library of America, 1993), 1:53, 1:78, 1:84, 1:321, 1:409–10, 2:760.

(79.) John Adams, The Works of John Adams, ed. Charles Francis Adams, 10 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1851), 4:285–86, 4:379–400, 5:90, 6:165–66.

(80.) Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy (New York: Free Press, 1962); Kenneth Prewitt and Alan Stone, The Ruling Elites: Elite Theory, Power, and American Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1973).

(81.) Albert Somit and Rudolf Wildenmann, eds., Hierarchy and Democracy (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University, 1991).

(82.) Lincoln, Collected Works, 1:114.

(83.) Lincoln, Collected Works, 2:247–83, 2:398–410, 3:522–50.

(84.) Doris Kearns Goodwin, Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2005); Allen C. Guelzo, Lincoln’s (p.263) Emancipation Proclamation: The End of Slavery in America (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004).

(85.) Lincoln, Collected Works, 6:30.

(86.) Lincoln, Collected Works, 2:245, 2:265–71, 4:17.

(87.) Lincoln, Collected Works, 3:315.

(88.) D. H. Fischer, Albion’s Seed: Four British Folkways in America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).

(89.) Lander, Lincoln and Darwin, 7–11, 40–57.

(90.) Elizabeth Fox-Genovese and Eugene D. Genovese, The Mind of the Master Class: History and Faith in the Southern Slaveholders’ Worldview (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Mark Noll, The Civil War as a Theological Crisis (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006).

(91.) Lincoln, Collected Works, 8: 333.

(92.) Arnhart, “Abraham Lincoln’s Biblical Liberalism”; Joseph Fornieri, Abraham Lincoln’s Political Faith (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2003).

(93.) Noll, Civil War, 50.

(94.) Samuel Bowles, “Did Warfare among Hunter-Gatherers Affect the Evolution of Human Social Behaviors?,” Science, 324 (2009): 1293–98.

(95.) Azar Gat, War in Human Civilization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Malcolm Potts and Thomas Hayden, Sex and War: How Biology Explains Warfare and Terrorism and Offers a Path to a Safer World (Dallas: Benbella Books, 2008); Stephen Peter Rosen, War and Human Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); Raphael D. Sagarin and Terence Taylor, eds., Natural Security: A Darwinian Approach to a Dangerous World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008).

(96.) Winston S. Churchill, Marlborough: His Life and Times, 2 vols. (London: George G. Harrap, 1947), 2:381.

(97.) Isaiah Berlin, The Sense of Reality (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1996).

(98.) Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics.

(99.) Leo Strauss, “Epilogue,” in Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics, Herbert Storing, ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1962), 305–27.

(100.) Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1140a24–1145a11.

(101.) Goodall, Chimpanzees of Gombe; Sandin, Bonobos; De Waal, Chimpanzee Politics; De Waal, Good Natured; De Waal and Lanting, Bonobos.

(102.) Goodall, Chimpanzees of Gombe, 415.

(103.) Ibid., 568.

(104.) Sandin, Bonobos, 51.

(105.) Aristotle, History of Animals, 502a16–b27, 611a11–618a30; Parts of Animals, 648a6–13, 689b1–35; Metaphysics, 980a27–b25; Nicomachean Ethics, 1141a22–29.

(p.264) (106.) Thomas DiLorenzo, The Real Abraham Lincoln, His Agenda, and an Unnecessary War (Roseville, CA: Prima, 2003); Thomas DiLorenzo, Lincoln Unmasked: What You’re Not Supposed to Know about Dishonest Abe (New York: Crown Forum, 2006).

(107.) Thomas L. Krannawitter, Vindicating Lincoln: Defending the Politics of Our Greatest President (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008).

(108.) Joseph Fornieri, “Lincoln and the Emancipation Proclamation: A Model of Prudent Leadership,” in Tempered Strength: Studies in the Nature and Scope of Prudential Leadership, ed. Ethan Fishman (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002), 125–50; Guelzo, Emancipation Proclamation.

(109.) Douglas Den Uyl, The Virtue of Prudence (New York: Peter Lang, 1991).

(110.) Kenneth R. Hammond, Human Judgment and Social Policy: Irreducible Uncertainty, Inevitable Error, Unavoidable Injustice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).

(111.) Thiele, Judgment; Larry Arnhart, Aristotle on Political Reasoning: A Commentary on the “Rhetoric” (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1981).

(112.) Arnhart, Darwinian Natural Right; Jonathan Haidt, “The New Synthesis in Moral Psychology,” Science 316 (2007): 998–1001; Hauser, Moral Minds.

(113.) Jonathan Haidt, “The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment,” Psychological Review 108 (2001): 814–34; Jonathan Haidt, “The Moral Emotions,” in Handbook of Affective Sciences, ed. R. J. Davidson, K. R. Scherer, and H. H. Goldsmith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 852–70; Joshua D. Greene, “The Cognitive Neuroscience of Moral Judgment,” in The Cognitive Neurosciences, 4th ed., ed. Michael S. Gazzaniga (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009), 987–99.

(114.) Wilson, Consilience, 266.

(115.) Ibid., 55, 67–68, 70–71, 83–86, 109, 162–65, 167, 172–73, 240, 255, 263, 266, 276–77, 297–98; Larry Arnhart, Darwinian Conservatism: A Disputed Question, ed. Kenneth C. Blanchard Jr. (Exerter, UK: Imprint Academic, 2009), 104–11.

(116.) David Blitz, Emergent Evolution (Boston: Kluwer Academic, 1992); Philip Clayton, Mind and Emergence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Harold Morowitz, The Emergence of Everything: How the World Became Complex (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Corning, Holistic Darwinism.

(117.) R. E. Passingham, The Frontal Lobes and Voluntary Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); Deacon, Symbolic Species; Georg F. Striedter, Principles of Brain Evolution (Sunderland, MA: Sinauer Associates, 2005); Jablonka and Lamb, Evolution.

(p.265) (118.) Jeffrey M. Schwartz and Sharon Begley, The Mind and the Brain: Neuroplasticity and the Power of Mental Force (New York: HarperCollins, 2002); Normon Doidge, The Brain That Changes Itself (New York: Viking, 2007).

(119.) Larry Arnhart, “The Behavioral Sciences Are Historical Sciences of Emergent Complexity,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (2007): 18–19.

(120.) Ernst Mayr, What Makes Biology Unique? Considerations on the Autonomy of a Scientific Discipline (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

(121.) Philip Mirowski, More Heat Than Light: Economics as Social Physics, Physics as Nature’s Economics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Geoffrey M. Hodgson, How Economics Forgot History: The Problem of Historical Specificity in Social Science (London: Routledge, 2001); Geoffrey M. Hodgson and Thorbjorn Knudsen, Darwin’s Conjecture: The Search for General Principles of Social and Economic Evolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010).

(122.) Hubert M. Blalock Jr., Basic Dilemmas in the Social Sciences (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1984).

(123.) Gintis et al., “Moral Sentiments and Material Interests.”

(124.) Joseph Henrich, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin F. Camerer, Ernst Fehr, Herbert Gintis, and Richard McElreath, “Overview and Synthesis,” in Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small–Scale Societies, ed. Joseph Henrich, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr, and Herbert Gintis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 8–54; Joseph Henrich et al., “Markets, Religion, Community Size, and the Evolution of Fairness and Punishment,” Science 327 (2010): 1480–85.

Notes:

(1.) John R. Alford and John Hibbing, “The Origin of Politics: An Evolutionary Theory of Political Behavior,” Perspectives on Politics 2 (2004): 707–23; Larry Arnhart, “The New Darwinian Naturalism in Political Theory,” American Political Science Review 89 (1995): 389–400; Larry Arnhart, Darwinian Natural Right: The Biological Ethics of Human Nature (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998); Robert Blank and Samuel Hines, Biology and Political Science (London: Routledge, 2001); Peter Corning, The Synergism Hypothesis: A Theory of Progressive Evolution (New York: McGraw Hill, 1983); Peter Corning, Holistic Darwinism: Synergy, Cybernetics, and the Bioeconomics of Evolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); Gary R. Johnson, “The Evolutionary Origins of Government and Politics,” in Human Nature and Politics, ed. Albert Somit and Steven A. Peterson (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1995), 243–305; Roger D. Masters, The Nature of Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989); Roger D. Masters, Beyond Relativism: Science and Human Values (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1993); Albert Somit and Steven A. Peterson, The Failure of Democratic Nation Building: Ideology Meets Evolution (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Bradley A. Thayer, Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2004); James Q. Wilson, The Moral Sense (New York: Free Press, 1993).

(2.) Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek, The Search for American Political Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).

(3.) David Christian, Maps of Time: An Introduction to Big History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004).

(4.) Jane Mansbridge, ed., Beyond Self-Interest (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990); Elinor Ostrom, “Collective Action and the Evolution of (p.256) Social Norms,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 14 (2000): 137–58. Elinor Ostrom, “Policies That Crowd Out Reciprocity and Collective Action,” in Moral Sentiments and Material Interests: The Foundations of Cooperation in Economic Life, ed. Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles, Robert Boyd, and Ernst Fehr (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 253–75.

(5.) Ryan Patrick Hanley, “Political Science and Political Understanding: Isaiah Berlin on the Nature of Political Inquiry,” American Political Science Review 98 (2004): 327–39; Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1991); David Ricci, The Tragedy of Political Science (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); Leslie Paul Thiele, The Heart of Judgment: Practical Wisdom, Neuroscience, and Narrative (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

(6.) Michael Billig, “Political Rhetoric,” in Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology, ed. David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 222–50; George Marcus, W. Russell Neuman, and Michael MacKuen, Affective Intelligence and Political Judgment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000); George Marcus, The Sentimental Citizen: Emotion in Democratic Politics (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002); George Marcus, “The Psychology of Emotion and Politics,” in Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology, ed. David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis, 182–91; W. Russell Neuman, George E. Marcus, Ann N. Crigler, and Michael MacKuen, eds., The Affect Effect: Dynamics of Emotion in Political Thinking and Behavior (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007); Maria Elizabeth Grabe and Erik Page Bucy, Image Bite Politics: News and the Visual Framing of Elections (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

(7.) Ted G. Jelen and Clyde Wilcox, eds., Religion and Politics in Comparative Perspective: The One, the Few, and the Many (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

(8.) David Sloan Wilson, Darwin’s Cathedral: Evolution, Religion, and the Nature of Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002); David Sloan Wilson, “Human Groups as Adaptive Units: Toward a Permanent Consensus,” in The Innate Mind, vol. 2: Culture and Cognition, ed. Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence, and Stephen Stich (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 78–90.

(9.) Harvey Mansfield, Manliness (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006); Harvey Mansfield, “How to Understand Politics,” First Things, no. 175 (August/September 2007): 41–47.

(10.) Larry Arnhart, “Darwinian Liberal Education,” Academic Questions 19 (2006): 6–18; Ricci, Tragedy of Political Science.

(p.257) (11.) Edward O. Wilson, Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge (New York: Knopf, 1998).

(12.) Christopher Boehm, Hierarchy in the Forest: The Evolution of Egalitarian Behavior (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999); Alexandra Maryanski and Jonathan H. Turner, The Social Cage: Human Nature and the Evolution of Society (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992); John Tooby and Irven DeVore, “The Reconstruction of Hominid Behavioral Evolution through Strategic Modeling,” in The Evolution of Human Behavior: Primate Models, ed. Warren G. Kinzey (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 183–237.

(14.) Lee Alan Dugatkin, Cooperation among Animals: An Evolutionary Perspective (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Martin A. Nowak, Evolutionary Dynamics: Exploring the Equations of Life (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006); Martin A. Nowak, “Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation,” Science 314 (2006): 1560–63.

(15.) Donald Brown, Human Universals (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991).

(17.) Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).

(18.) William D. Hamilton, Narrow Roads of Gene Land: The Collected Papers of W. D. Hamilton (Oxford: W. H. Freeman, 1995).

(20.) Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Robert Trivers, “The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism,” Quarterly Review of Biology 46 (1971): 35–57.

(21.) Richard Alexander, The Biology of Moral Systems (Hawthorne, NY: Aldine de Gruyter, 1987); Karl Sigmund, The Calculus of Selfishness (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).

(22.) Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles, Robert Boyd, and Ernest Fehr, “Moral Sentiments and Material Interests: Origins, Evidence, and Consequences,” in Moral Sentiments and Material Interests, ed. Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles, Robert Boyd, and Ernst Fehr, 3–40; Natalie Henrich and Joseph Henrich, Why Humans Cooperate: A Cultural and Evolutionary Explanation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Ernst Fehr and Urs Fischbacher, “Third Party Sanction and Social Norms,” Evolution and Human Behavior 25 (2004): 63–87; Ernst Fehr and S. Gachter, “Altruistic Punishment in Humans,” Nature 415 (2002): 137–40; Sigmund, The Calculus of Selfishness.

(23.) Joseph Henrich, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, (p.258) Ernst Fehr, and Herbert Gintis, eds., Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

(24.) Arnhart, Darwinian Natural Right; Marc Hauser, Moral Minds: How Nature Designed Our Universal Sense of Right and Wrong (New York: Harper-Collins, 2006).

(25.) Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man, 2d ed. (London: Penguin Books, 2004), 119–72, 679–82; Charles Darwin, Charles Darwin’s Notebooks, 1836–1844, ed. P. H. Barret, P. J. Gautrey, S. Herbert, D. Kohn, and S. Smith (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 617–29.

(26.) David Berreby, Us and Them: Understanding Your Tribal Mind (New York: Little, Brown, 2005).

(27.) George C. Williams, Adaptation and Natural Selection: A Critique of Some Current Evolutionary Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966); George C. Williams, Natural Selection: Domains, Levels, and Challenges (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).

(28.) Elliott Sober and David Sloan Wilson, Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998); Wilson, “Human Groups as Adaptive Units”; David Sloan Wilson, Evolution for Everyone: How Darwin’s Theory Can Change the Way We Think about Our Lives (New York: Delacorte Press, 2007); David Sloan Wilson and Edward O. Wilson, “Rethinking the Theoretical Foundation of Sociobiology,” Quarterly Review of Biology 82 (2007): 327–48.

(29.) Boehm, Hierarchy; Jane Goodall, The Chimpanzees of Gombe: Patterns of Behavior (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986); Alexander H. Harcourt and Frans de Waal, eds., Coalitions and Alliances in Humans and Other Animals (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Arnold Ludwig, King of the Mountain: The Nature of Political Leadership (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2002); Allan Mazur, Biosociology of Dominance and Deference (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005); Frans de Waal, Chimpanzee Politics: Power and Sex among Apes (New York: Harper and Row, 1982); Frans de Waal, Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996).

(32.) Alexander Rustow, Freedom and Domination: A Historical Critique of Civilization (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980); James C. Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009).

(33.) Niccolo Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, trans. Harvey Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 1.4–5, 1.16.

(p.259) (34.) Takayoshi Kano, The Last Ape: Pygmy Chimpanzee Behavior and Ecology (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992); Ian Parker, “Swingers,” The New Yorker, July 30, 2007, 48–61; Jo Sandin, Bonobos: Encounters in Empathy (Milwaukee: Zoological Society of Milwaukee and the Foundation for Wildlife Conservation, 2007); Frans de Waal and Frans Lanting, Bonobo: The Forgotten Ape (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Richard W. Wrangham and Dale Peterson, Demonic Males: Apes and the Origins of Human Violence (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1996).

(35.) Frans de Waal, Our Inner Ape (New York: Penguin Books, 2005).

(36.) Douglas Madsen, “Serotonin and Social Rank among Human Males,” in The Neurotransmitter Revolution: Serotonin, Social Behavior, and the Law, ed. Roger D. Masters and Michael T. McGuire (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1994), 146–58; Allan Mazur and Alan Booth, “Testosterone and Dominance in Men,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1998): 353–63; James M. Dabbs and Mary Godwin Dabbs, Heroes, Rogues, and Lovers: Testosterone and Behavior (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2000); Peter T. Ellison, “Social Relationships and Reproductive Ecology,” in Endocrinology of Social Relationships, ed. Peter T. Ellison and Peter B. Gray (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 54–73.

(37.) Michael Marmot, The Status Syndrome: How Social Standing Affects Our Health and Longevity (New York: Henry Holt, 2004).

(38.) Abraham Lincoln, The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, ed. Roy P. Basler, 9 vols. (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1953), 1:8, 108–15; William H. Herndon, Herndon’s Life of Lincoln (New York: Da Capo Press, 1983), 172, 422–23.

(45.) Adrian Desmond and James Moore, Darwin’s Sacred Cause: How a Hatred of Slavery Shaped Darwin’s Views on Human Evolution (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2009); Adam Gopnik, Angels and Ages: A Short Book about Darwin, Lincoln, and Modern Life (New York: Knopf, 2009); James Lander, Lincoln and Darwin: Shared Visions of Race, Science, and Religion (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2010).

(47.) Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 2.

(48.) Eva Jablonka and Marion J. Lamb, Evolution in Four Dimensions: (p.260) Genetic, Epigenetic, Behavioral, and Symbolic Variation in the History of Life (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 160.

(49.) William McGrew, The Cultural Chimpanzee: Reflections on Cultural Primatology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); A. Whiten, J. Goodall, W. C. McGrew, T. Nishida, V. Reynolds, Y. Sugiyama, C. E. G. Turin, R. W. Wrangham, and C. Boesch, “Cultures in Chimpanzees,” Nature 399 (1999): 682–85; A. Whiten, J. Goodall, W. C. McGrew, T. Nishida, V. Reynolds, Y. Sugiyama, C. E. G. Tutin, R. W. Wrangham, and C. Boesch, “Charting Cultural Variants in Chimpanzees,” Behaviour 138 (2001): 1481–1516; Andrew Whiten, “The Identification and Differentiation of Culture in Chimpanzees and Other Animals from Natural History to Diffusion Experiments,” in The Question of Animal Culture, ed. Kevin N. Laland and Bennett G. Galef (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 99–124.

(52.) Peter J. Richerson and Robert Boyd, Not by Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed Human Evolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); Joseph Henrich and Richard McElreath, “Dual-Inheritance Theory: The Evolution of Human Cultural Capacities and Cultural Evolution,” in The Oxford Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology, ed. R. I. M. Dunbar and Louise Barrett (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 555–70.

(53.) Terence W. Deacon, The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of Language and the Brain (New York: Norton, 1997); Kim Hill, “Animal ‘Culture’?,” in The Question of Animal Culture, ed. Kevin N. Laland and Bennett G. Galef (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 269–87; Jablonka and Lamb, Evolution.

(54.) Aristotle, History of Animals, 488a7–14; Politics, 1253a1–18; Larry Arnhart, “Aristotle, Chimpanzees, and Other Political Animals,” Social Science Information 29 (1990): 479–559; Larry Arnhart, “The Darwinian Biology of Aristotle’s Political Animals,” American Journal of Political Science 38 (1994): 464–85.

(55.) Jurgen Gadau and Jennifer Fewell, eds., Organization of Insect Societies: From Genome to Sociocomplexity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009); Bert Holldobler and E. O. Wilson, The Ants (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990); Bert Holldobler and E. O. Wilson, The Superorganism: The Beauty, Elegance, and Strangeness of Insect Societies (New York: Norton, 2009); Thomas D. Seeley, Honeybee Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).

(56.) Henrich and Henrich, Why Humans Cooperate; Peter Turchin, War and Peace and War: The Rise and Fall of Empires (New York: Penguin Books, 2006).

(57.) Donald S. Lutz, The Origins of American Constitutionalism (Baton (p.261) Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988); Eric Nelson, The Hebrew Republic: Jewish Sources and the Transformation of European Political Thought (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010).

(58.) S. E. Finer, The History of Government, 3 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

(59.) Daniel Lord Smail, On Deep History and the Brain (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008).

(60.) Christian, Maps of Time; Ian Morris, Why the West Rules—For Now: The Patterns of History, and What They Reveal about the Future (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010).

(61.) Eric Chaisson, Cosmic Evolution: The Rise of Complexity in Nature (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001).

(62.) Oliver Morton, Eating the Sun: How Plants Power the Planet (New York: HarperCollins, 2008).

(63.) F. John Odling-Smee, Kevin N. Laland, and Marcus W. Feldman, Niche Construction: The Neglected Process in Evolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).

(64.) Herndon, Life of Lincoln, 354; Robert Chambers, Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation, ed. James A. Secord (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).

(65.) Lincoln, Collected Works, 2:437–42, 3:356–63, 3:471–82, 6:151–52; Eugene F. Miller, “Democratic Statecraft and Technological Advance: Abraham Lincoln’s Reflections on ‘Discoveries and Inventions,’ ” Review of Politics 63 (2001): 485–515; Lander, Lincoln and Darwin, 7–13; Larry Arnhart, “Abraham Lincoln’s Biblical Liberalism,” St. John’s Review 36 (Summer 1985): 25–40.

(66.) Gerhard Lenski, Ecological-Evolutionary Theory (Boulder, CO: Paradigm, 2005; Ted C. Lewellen, Political Anthropology: An Introduction, 3d ed. (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003); Chris Scarre, ed., The Human Past: World Prehistory and the Development of Human Societies, 2d ed. (London: Thames and Hudson, 2009).

(68.) Reinhard Bendix, Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).

(69.) E. Adamson Hoebel, The Law of Primitive Man: A Study in Comparative Legal Dynamics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954); Richard B. Lee, The !Kung San: Men, Women, and Work in a Foraging Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 343–50, 457–61; Allen W. Johnson and Timothy Earle, The Evolution of Human Societies: From Foraging Group to Agrarian State, 2d ed. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000), 54–89; Robert L. Kelly, The Foraging Spectrum: Diversity in Hunter-Gatherer Lifeways (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, (p.262) 1995), 295–97; Doron Shultziner, Thomas Stevens, Martin Stevens, Brian A. Stewart, Rebecca J. Hannagan, and Giulia Saltini-Semerari, “The Causes and Scope of Political Egalitarianism during the Last Glacial: A Multi-Disciplinary Perspective,” Biology & Philosophy 25 (2010): 319–46.

(70.) Lewellen, Political Anthropology; Masters, The Nature of Politics; Roger Masters, Machiavelli, Leonardo, and the Science of Power (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996).

(71.) Boehm, Hierarchy; Maryanski and Turner, The Social Cage; Mark F. Grady and Michael T. McGuire, “The Nature of Constitutions,” Journal of Bioeconomics 1 (1999): 227–40; Paul Rubin, Darwinian Politics: The Evolutionary Origin of Freedom (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002).

(73.) Daniel J. Elazar, Covenant and Polity in Biblical Israel (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1995); Yoran Hazony, “Does the Bible Have a Political Teaching?,” Hebraic Political Studies 1 (2006): 137–61; Nelson, Hebrew Republic.

(74.) Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967); Paul Rahe, Republics Ancient and Modern: Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992).

(75.) Donald S. Lutz, Principles of Constitutional Design (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 26.

(76.) Charles C. Thach, The Creation of the Presidency, 1775–1789 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969).

(77.) Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist, ed. Jacob E. Cooke (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1961), 65.

(78.) Bernard Bailyn, ed., The Debate on the Constitution: Federalist and Antifederalist Speeches, Articles, and Letters during the Struggle over Ratification, 2 vols. (New York: Library of America, 1993), 1:53, 1:78, 1:84, 1:321, 1:409–10, 2:760.

(79.) John Adams, The Works of John Adams, ed. Charles Francis Adams, 10 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1851), 4:285–86, 4:379–400, 5:90, 6:165–66.

(80.) Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy (New York: Free Press, 1962); Kenneth Prewitt and Alan Stone, The Ruling Elites: Elite Theory, Power, and American Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1973).

(81.) Albert Somit and Rudolf Wildenmann, eds., Hierarchy and Democracy (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University, 1991).

(84.) Doris Kearns Goodwin, Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2005); Allen C. Guelzo, Lincoln’s (p.263) Emancipation Proclamation: The End of Slavery in America (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004).

(88.) D. H. Fischer, Albion’s Seed: Four British Folkways in America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).

(90.) Elizabeth Fox-Genovese and Eugene D. Genovese, The Mind of the Master Class: History and Faith in the Southern Slaveholders’ Worldview (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Mark Noll, The Civil War as a Theological Crisis (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006).

(92.) Arnhart, “Abraham Lincoln’s Biblical Liberalism”; Joseph Fornieri, Abraham Lincoln’s Political Faith (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2003).

(94.) Samuel Bowles, “Did Warfare among Hunter-Gatherers Affect the Evolution of Human Social Behaviors?,” Science, 324 (2009): 1293–98.

(95.) Azar Gat, War in Human Civilization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Malcolm Potts and Thomas Hayden, Sex and War: How Biology Explains Warfare and Terrorism and Offers a Path to a Safer World (Dallas: Benbella Books, 2008); Stephen Peter Rosen, War and Human Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); Raphael D. Sagarin and Terence Taylor, eds., Natural Security: A Darwinian Approach to a Dangerous World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008).

(96.) Winston S. Churchill, Marlborough: His Life and Times, 2 vols. (London: George G. Harrap, 1947), 2:381.

(97.) Isaiah Berlin, The Sense of Reality (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1996).

(99.) Leo Strauss, “Epilogue,” in Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics, Herbert Storing, ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1962), 305–27.

(100.) Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1140a24–1145a11.

(103.) Ibid., 568.

(105.) Aristotle, History of Animals, 502a16–b27, 611a11–618a30; Parts of Animals, 648a6–13, 689b1–35; Metaphysics, 980a27–b25; Nicomachean Ethics, 1141a22–29.

(p.264) (106.) Thomas DiLorenzo, The Real Abraham Lincoln, His Agenda, and an Unnecessary War (Roseville, CA: Prima, 2003); Thomas DiLorenzo, Lincoln Unmasked: What You’re Not Supposed to Know about Dishonest Abe (New York: Crown Forum, 2006).

(107.) Thomas L. Krannawitter, Vindicating Lincoln: Defending the Politics of Our Greatest President (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008).

(108.) Joseph Fornieri, “Lincoln and the Emancipation Proclamation: A Model of Prudent Leadership,” in Tempered Strength: Studies in the Nature and Scope of Prudential Leadership, ed. Ethan Fishman (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002), 125–50; Guelzo, Emancipation Proclamation.

(109.) Douglas Den Uyl, The Virtue of Prudence (New York: Peter Lang, 1991).

(110.) Kenneth R. Hammond, Human Judgment and Social Policy: Irreducible Uncertainty, Inevitable Error, Unavoidable Injustice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).

(111.) Thiele, Judgment; Larry Arnhart, Aristotle on Political Reasoning: A Commentary on the “Rhetoric” (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1981).

(112.) Arnhart, Darwinian Natural Right; Jonathan Haidt, “The New Synthesis in Moral Psychology,” Science 316 (2007): 998–1001; Hauser, Moral Minds.

(113.) Jonathan Haidt, “The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment,” Psychological Review 108 (2001): 814–34; Jonathan Haidt, “The Moral Emotions,” in Handbook of Affective Sciences, ed. R. J. Davidson, K. R. Scherer, and H. H. Goldsmith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 852–70; Joshua D. Greene, “The Cognitive Neuroscience of Moral Judgment,” in The Cognitive Neurosciences, 4th ed., ed. Michael S. Gazzaniga (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009), 987–99.

(115.) Ibid., 55, 67–68, 70–71, 83–86, 109, 162–65, 167, 172–73, 240, 255, 263, 266, 276–77, 297–98; Larry Arnhart, Darwinian Conservatism: A Disputed Question, ed. Kenneth C. Blanchard Jr. (Exerter, UK: Imprint Academic, 2009), 104–11.

(116.) David Blitz, Emergent Evolution (Boston: Kluwer Academic, 1992); Philip Clayton, Mind and Emergence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Harold Morowitz, The Emergence of Everything: How the World Became Complex (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Corning, Holistic Darwinism.

(117.) R. E. Passingham, The Frontal Lobes and Voluntary Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); Deacon, Symbolic Species; Georg F. Striedter, Principles of Brain Evolution (Sunderland, MA: Sinauer Associates, 2005); Jablonka and Lamb, Evolution.

(p.265) (118.) Jeffrey M. Schwartz and Sharon Begley, The Mind and the Brain: Neuroplasticity and the Power of Mental Force (New York: HarperCollins, 2002); Normon Doidge, The Brain That Changes Itself (New York: Viking, 2007).

(119.) Larry Arnhart, “The Behavioral Sciences Are Historical Sciences of Emergent Complexity,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (2007): 18–19.

(120.) Ernst Mayr, What Makes Biology Unique? Considerations on the Autonomy of a Scientific Discipline (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

(121.) Philip Mirowski, More Heat Than Light: Economics as Social Physics, Physics as Nature’s Economics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Geoffrey M. Hodgson, How Economics Forgot History: The Problem of Historical Specificity in Social Science (London: Routledge, 2001); Geoffrey M. Hodgson and Thorbjorn Knudsen, Darwin’s Conjecture: The Search for General Principles of Social and Economic Evolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010).

(122.) Hubert M. Blalock Jr., Basic Dilemmas in the Social Sciences (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1984).

(124.) Joseph Henrich, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin F. Camerer, Ernst Fehr, Herbert Gintis, and Richard McElreath, “Overview and Synthesis,” in Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small–Scale Societies, ed. Joseph Henrich, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr, and Herbert Gintis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 8–54; Joseph Henrich et al., “Markets, Religion, Community Size, and the Evolution of Fairness and Punishment,” Science 327 (2010): 1480–85.